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Israel’s preventive attacks against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and 
Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear site in 2007 are often used to illustrate a fundamental precept of 
realism—that states will use military force to halt the rise of a rival state, especially if 
that rival attempts to gain a nuclear weapons capability. However, this approach does not 
fully explain the timing of such attacks, nor does it account for the consequences 
of violating another state’s sovereignty. In contrast to realism’s emphasis on the 
material balance of power, constructivism focuses on how ideational factors, such as 
norms of appropriate behavior, shape and constrain a state’s behavior. By process 
tracing the events surrounding the attacks at Osirak and Al-Kibar, this thesis 
finds that the international norms of sovereignty, intervention, and non-
proliferation had a strong influence over Israel’s behavior. It builds a normative 
theory of preventive attack that highlights the role that national identity, 
sanctions, and ethics play in counter-proliferation strategies. Finally, it concludes 
by offering policy recommendations for predicting future preventive attacks and 
leveraging international norms to halt nuclear proliferation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Silent enim leges inter arma; the law falls silent in times of war. 
—Cicero1  
 
Dominant states are continually concerned with the threats posed to their relative 
power by rival states. States will often go to great lengths to prevent being overtaken by 
their opponents, an especially true point following the introduction of a new technology. 
However, dominant states have other, competing concerns when calculating whether to 
take preventive action, beyond just the threat posed to their relative power. Robert 
Fulton’s vision of the submarine would change the nature of naval warfare and could 
have immediately shifted the balance of sea power in Europe at the beginning of the 19th 
century. In 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte’s government commissioned Fulton to build the 
Nautilus submarine, hoping for a machine that could silently attack ships in harbor and 
greatly reduce the maritime advantage that Great Britain held over its continental rivals.2 
British leaders were so fearful that Fulton’s new technology would pose a threat to their 
relative power that they considered assassinating Fulton—an American citizen—to 
prevent submarines from menacing the Royal fleet. However, British leaders eventually 
decided to buy off Fulton and in 1804, commissioned him to build a range of other naval 
technologies, delaying the development of the submarine.3  
Almost paradoxically, in 1807, Britain responded in a completely different 
manner to another threat to its maritime superiority. During the rise of Napoleon’s 
Continental System at the turn of the 19th century, Denmark, although neutral, was under 
pressure to pledge its fleet to France. Fearing that the Dano-Norwegian fleet would 
provide Napoleon the means to strangle Britain’s merchant trade through the North Sea 
and Baltic Sea, London took preventive action to avert losing its substantial naval power 
                                                 
1 Marcus Tullius Cicero, “Pro Milone,” in M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes, ed. Albert Curtis Clark, vol. 2 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901), 11. 
2 Fulton did not begin working for the French until the British turned him down on his offer. 
3 Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Edge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941). 
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over its continental rivals. In November of 1807, the Royal Navy bombarded the ships 
held in the ports of Copenhagen, simultaneously destroying Napoleon’s hopes of 
overtaking the British empire’s sea power.4 Why was Great Britain unwilling to kill one 
man pledged to arm its opponents and yet, four years later, resolved to bombard a neutral 
state that had yet to commit its armada? A combination of factors explains the variation 
in Britain’s use of force, ranging from the immediacy of the threat to the options 
available to counter it. In particular, international norms played a key role in shaping 
Britain’s response. At the beginning of the 1800s, assassination had fallen out of favor 
and was deemed inappropriate behavior for an international power like Great Britain,5 
while preventive attack to counter a rising France was considered a fitting response. 
International norms were not the only factors at play in shaping British behavior; 
however, they did influence the military options available to the British – barring an 
efficient tactic, while allowing another that lacked proportionality toward non-
combatants. 
A. NORMS AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION 
Just as British preventive strategy was affected by the norms on the use of force 
during the 19th century, the United States has faced a similar challenge throughout the 
20th and 21st century. However, instead of being concerned with maintaining its power at 
sea, the United States has been focused on preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear inhibition, both non-proliferation and counter-proliferation,6 has been 
a driving force behind U.S. foreign policy since the dawn of the atomic age in 1945. 
Francis Gavin argues that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has had a 
                                                 
4 A.N. Ryan, “The Causes of British Attack upon Copenhagen in 1807,” The English Historical 
Review 68, no. 266 (1953): 37–53; Prior to the 1807 bombardment, in 1801 the British Fleet, under the 
command of Lord Nelson, conducted their first naval attack on the Danish Fleet, demonstrating its resolve 
for preventive attack strategies. 
5 Ward Thomas, “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination,” International 
Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 105–33. 
6 Non-proliferation approaches are political, diplomatic, and economic measures, such as arms and 
export controls, site inspections, and treaty commitments, intended to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons. In contrast, counter-proliferation approaches are more active measures designed to halt the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or deny their efficacy, to include the interdiction of nuclear material, 
preventive attacks against nuclear weapon development sites, or the employment of counter strikes to 
prevent use of nuclear weapons. 
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greater effect on U.S. foreign policy since World War II than either the containment of 
communist ideology or the global intervention to maintain international trade and free 
markets.7 The United States’ motivation to restrain proliferation has led it to undertake a 
range of policies, from leading the establishment of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) to the more coercive step of threatening to abandon its alliances with West 
Germany and Taiwan, if they did not halt their procurement of nuclear weapons. When 
required, the United States has also been willing to engage in the preventive use of force 
to halt rogue states from obtaining nuclear weapons, as was a stated, though mistaken 
case during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
There exists, however, an inherent tension between the U.S. grand strategy to 
prevent nuclear proliferation and the United States’ tradition of respecting the 
sovereignty of other states in the international system. Realism predicts that states will 
develop military capabilities based on their desire for survival and security—balancing 
against the power of other states by either developing their own military strength or by 
engaging in alliances with partners. The United States has traditionally respected this 
fundamental right to develop not only defensive capabilities but, more often than not, to 
develop offensive capabilities as well. Although the offensive capabilities of some rival 
states might pose a threat, the United States has generally adhered to the principle of 
sovereignty: that states are allowed to decide activity within their own borders, free from 
intervention by an outside state. However, when it comes to the development of nuclear 
weapons capabilities, international sovereignty has been relegated to a subordinate 
concern.  
The demotion of sovereignty in this instance does not mean that the United States 
or other states have completely dismissed its importance when attempting to counter 
nuclear proliferation. Just as norms against assassination dissuaded the British 
government from killing Fulton, so has the norm of sovereignty constrained the United 
States from directly striking against rival states attempting to gain nuclear weapons. 
However, the way that norms affect preventive strike still remains unclear. Further, states 
                                                 
7 Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and 
Nonproliferation,” International Security 40, no. 1 (2015): 9–46. 
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face a conflict between the norm of sovereignty and other international conventions—
such as norms of intervention that have evolved over the last 300 years and the non-
proliferation norms that have arisen over the last half a century. To better understand 
these conflicts—the tension between liberal ideology versus countering proliferation and 
the tension between norms of sovereignty versus norms of intervention and non-
proliferation—this thesis seeks to address the question of how international norms 
influence the preventive use of force in countering nuclear proliferation.  
B. LITERATURE ON THE PREVENTIVE USE OF FORCE 
Research on the preventive use of force has been an enduring thread of security 
studies, starting with Thucydides exploration of the preventive war between Sparta and 
Athens. Preventive strategies are anticipatory in nature—a state strikes first because it 
foresees the unavoidability of conflict in the long term. Due to this anticipatory nature, 
preventive strategies are often combined and confused with preemptive strategies, in both 
security studies and foreign policy decision-making. The 2002 U.S. National Security 
Strategy exemplifies this confusion. Written in the wake of 9/11, the strategy proclaimed 
the need for preventive action against global threats; however, it used the term 
preemption to describe this approach. A preemptive act is based on the presence of an 
imminent threat, while a preventive act is based on the fear that war will eventually 
happen. Levy succinctly differentiates between the two concepts, explaining that 
“preemptors do not want war but feel that they have no choice, while preventers want war 
in the short term to avoid the risk of war under less favorable conditions in the long 
term.”8 Preemptive strategies are borne out of the idea that there is a decided military 
advantage to striking first, coupled with the presence of an immediate and inevitable 
threat.9  
                                                 
8 Jack Levy, “Preventive War: Concepts and Propositions,” International Interactions 37, no. 1 
(2011): 88. 
9 Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen,” 
International Security 20, no. 2 (1995): 5–34. 
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In contrast, preventive strategies are motivated by the “changing power 
differentials between states arising from uneven rates of growth.”10 As one state is on 
pace to match, surpass, or outdistance another state in the material balance of power, 
there is an advantage to striking before those gains can be realized. Due to this emphasis 
on relative power, preventive strategies have long been the focus of the realist tradition 
within international politics. Morgenthau viewed preventive war as one way to preserve 
equilibrium across the international system.11 Michael Howard argues that most wars 
originate from the “perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears 
for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own.”12 Power transition theorists argue 
that war between states is most likely when a rising challenger is in the process of 
overtaking a dominant state.13 Gilpin’s hegemonic stability theory offers a model of this 
behavior in which the hegemon will maintain peace throughout the international system 
until rising costs and growing competitors force the hegemon to either engage in war or 
abdicate its position of power.14 He notes that “according to realism, the fundamental 
cause of wars among states and changes in the international systems is the uneven growth 
of power among states.”15  
Within preventive strategies, an important distinction must be made between 
preventive war and preventive attack. Preventive wars are longer campaigns to eliminate 
the full military power of a rival or change the regime. Preventive attacks, in comparison, 
are more acute responses, focused on eliminating a specific military capability or limiting 
the relative military gains of a competitor. Levy argues that the relative significance of 
the power shift often dictates whether a state engages in preventive strike instead of 
                                                 
10 Jack Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40, no. 1 
(1987): 82. 
11 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 202–3. 
12 Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 18. 
13 See Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, for discussion of transition between ‘great powers.’ See 
Houweling and Siccama, “Power Transition as a Cause of War,” for an extension of this argument to 
include ‘major powers.’  
14 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1981). 
15 Ibid., 94. 
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preventive war, explaining that limited shifts will often lead to military responses short of 
war. The prudence of preventive attack is often a function of a state’s uncertainty over its 
opponent’s intentions combined with that state’s certainty over its own current military 
capability.16 A 2006 RAND study argues that evaluating the efficacy of a preventive 
strike can be boiled down to two fundamental strategic variables: first, the degree of 
uncertainty that an opponent will use its anticipated military gains to attack in the future, 
and second, the degree of certainty that the potential preventive strike will be 
successful.17 Preventive attacks are not just based on a rising threat, but also on the 
ability of the dominant state to respond to that threat.  
The emergence of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II created a new 
motivation for preventive attack. Levy notes that “power shifts are most likely to trigger a 
preventive response if they cross an important threshold of military power, the clearest 
example of which is the nuclear threshold.”18 Dominant states, whether system leaders, 
regional hegemons, or status quo powers, have historically been the most likely to 
conduct preventive attacks to counter nuclear proliferation. Gavin and Rapp-Hooper 
argue that dominant states’ bias toward preventive counter-proliferation originates from a 
“motivation by a system-leading power against emerging nuclear states” that is driven 
“by a fear of the limitations nuclear proliferation places on a leading state’s ability to 
project power.”19 Even when nuclear weapons are unlikely to significantly alter the 
balance of power, system leaders and hegemons still not do not want their military, 
economic, and soft power degraded, nor their geographic power projection diminished.20  
Research into preventive attacks to counter nuclear proliferation has largely 
focused on the efficacy of those attacks. Kreps and Fuhrmann analyzed 18 cases of 
preventive attack against state nuclear facilities between 1942 to 2007, identifying four 
                                                 
16 Karl P. Mueller et al., Striking First (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006). 
17 Ibid., chap. 2. 
18 Levy, “Preventive War: Concepts and Propositions,” 88. 
19 Francis J. Gavin and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “The Copenhagen Temptation: Rethinking Prevention and 
Proliferation in the Age of Deterrence Dominance” (Tobin Project, 2011), 2. 
20 Ibid., 38. 
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theoretical mechanisms through which attacks can affect nuclear weapons programs.21 
Strikes can directly destroy the chokepoint facilities that are essential for fissile material 
production; they can also indirectly alter a state’s fissile material production strategy, 
deter foreign suppliers from supporting a state’s nuclear ambitions, and lead to enhanced 
international sanctions against a proliferating state.22 Kreps and Fuhrmann note that 
preventive strikes undertaken during peacetime tended to be successful at delaying the 
nuclear capabilities of the adversary state; however, these attacks took place well before 
an imminent threat existed, making them the least legitimate under international law. 
Reiter takes a more skeptical view on the value of preventive attacks against nuclear 
facilities, arguing that the attack often increases the resolve of the proliferating state and 
influences it to seek covert pathways to nuclear material that are more difficult to detect 
and deter.23 
In contrast to the realist focus on shifting power dynamics, constructivists 
emphasize the social aspect of world politics and how evolving norms have shaped 
military intervention. Martha Finnemore argues that changes in the purpose of the use of 
force have shaped national security policy. National interests are indeterminate and can 
justify both intervention and non-intervention; instead, the legitimacy of using military 
force has been a key explanatory variable for its use.24 Along with shaping national 
security policy, norms can also constrain the strategic options available to states leaders. 
Ward Thomas argues that international norms have restricted the use of assassination by 
state powers, even when it might be a more effective way of dealing with emerging 
threats.25 Prior to the 1991 war against Iraq, British leaders proposed assassinating Iraqi 
                                                 
21 Sarah E. Kreps and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities 
Affect Proliferation?,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (2011): 161–87; Matthew Fuhrmann and 
Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 6 
(2010): 831–59. 
22 Kreps and Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect 
Proliferation?,” 162. 
23 Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osirak,” The 
Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 2 (2005): 355–71. 
24 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), l. 121. 
25 Thomas, “Norms and Security”; Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in 
International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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President Saddam Hussein with their Israeli and American counterparts; however, U.S. 
President George Bush vetoed the idea because it would have ended both his domestic 
support from Congress and his foreign support from the international coalition.26 The 
norms against assassination limited the United States’ options against Iraq, guiding it 
toward a full-scale military intervention that was more expensive in both blood and 
treasure. 
Similar to the constructivist emphasis on the norms of intervention, normative 
theorists have concentrated on the ethical and legal aspects of the use of force. Michael 
Walzer offers a comprehensive case for just war theory, emphasizing the importance of 
legitimacy, proportionality, and necessity in the use of military force; however, just as 
important as his treatment of the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, Walzer 
highlights how ethical considerations have been an enduring part of decisions to go to 
war, along with national interests and utilitarian calculations.27 Following the events of 
11 September 2001, the preventive use of force became a thoroughly debated strategy for 
dealing with terrorist organizations and rogue states. Abraham Sofaer contends that 
international law and global institutions have lost their ability to prevent conflict; instead, 
he calls for a state-centric approach to evaluate the purpose, options, proportionality, and 
consequences of military action.28 Sofaer believes that legitimacy, not legality, should be 
the guiding principle when a state considers employing a preventive strategy. John Yoo, a 
key national security counselor for President George W. Bush, furthers this cause by 
arguing that states should consider the ‘global welfare’ of eliminating a threat when 
determining the value, and legitimacy, of a preventive attack.29  
                                                 
26 Yossi Melman, “The Diplomacy of Death : When Spies Execute Foreign Policy : Why the Plot to 
Kill Hussein Failed,” Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-21/opinion/op-
101_1_saddam-hussein. 
27 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 5th ed. 
(New York: Basic Books, 2015). 
28 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Best Defense? Legitimacy and Preventive Force, Kindle (Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press, 2010). 
29 John Yoo, Point of Attack: Preventive War, International Law, and Global Welfare, 1st ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN AND ROADMAP 
Although realists have developed a firm understanding of preventive strategies 
and constructivists have conceptualized the influence of norms on military intervention, a 
gap persists between these two bodies of scholarship—separating the realist paradigm of 
preventive attack from the constructivist logic of norms. This thesis attempts to bridge 
that gap by exploring the causal relationship between the norms of sovereignty, 
intervention, and non-proliferation and the preventive use of force to counter the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. To achieve this goal, it will explore the two cases of 
proliferation-focused preventive attack outside of an ongoing war: Israel’s strike on 
Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and its attack on Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear reactor in 
2007. Although the two attacks are remarkably similar, both being aerial bombings 
against a neighboring Middle Eastern state, changes to the international system over the 
26 years between the two attacks allow for rich analysis of how international norms 
influenced each event.   
This thesis does not argue that international norms have a deterministic effect, 
commanding whether or not a state will conduct a preventive attack; rather, it attempts to 
explain how they influence the behavior of states that conduct preventive attacks to 
counter proliferation. It finds that three key causal mechanisms exist through which the 
norms of sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation influence preventive attacks. 
First, the constituting nature of these norms fosters a communitarian divide between the 
attacking state and its adversary, loosening restrictions on the use of force. Second, the 
sanctioning component of these norms causes the attacking state to undertake a gradualist 
campaign, involving both diplomacy and covert action, prior to conducting a preventive 
attack. Finally, the ethical component of these norms provides a framework through 
which a state justifies and attempts to legitimize its actions to the international 
community. Additionally, all three mechanisms are influenced by shifts in the structure of 
power and the normative landscape of the international community.  
Capturing the influence of sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation is a 
problematic undertaking. Norms exist in an ideational realm; while their consequences 
might be actual, norms themselves are not tangible manifestations that can be directly 
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observed. This dualism creates a dilemma when attempting to identify the causal 
relationships between international norms and state action. Wendt argues that “since we 
cannot observe norms in their entirety, we cannot conclusively establish the causal 
relationships between norms and behavior,” and to overcome this epistemological 
challenge, researchers must rely on “theorizing about the mechanisms that produce their 
causal relations.”30 Causal mechanisms can be viewed as interdependent entities that 
serve as the ‘cogs and wheels’ of a larger phenomenon.31 They are found in the 
intervening steps between the independent and dependent variables, not only connecting 
the two but also transmitting ideas, information, or emotions from one to the other. Like 
the norms they model, these mechanisms are intangible; therefore, researching their 
influence requires a focus on their observable manifestations.32  
To uncover these observable manifestations, this thesis relies on process tracing to 
peer into the black box of state behavior and parse the effects of norms. Process tracing is 
a qualitative methodology that investigates the circumstances within a single case study 
to make inferences about the connections between the causative force and its dependent 
result.33 Process tracing is best understood when compared to other qualitative methods, 
such as structured focused comparison, that attempt to determine the causal effect 
between an independent and dependent variable. While comparative methods seek to 
show that X caused Y, process tracing is focused on explaining how X caused Y. It 
makes inferences about causal mechanisms based on the observations within a single 
case, as opposed to comparing events and outcomes across a group of cases. With its 
rigorous focus on the progression and connection of events, process tracing is 
“particularly well-suited to the task of uncovering intervening causal mechanisms and 
                                                 
30 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 62. 
31 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 29. 
32 Alexander L. George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 137. 
33 For its reasoning and application, see Beach and Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations 
and Guidelines; Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic 
Tool (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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exploring reciprocal causation and endogeneity effects.”34 This aptness is valuable 
because the exploration of norms is often hindered by endogeneity dilemmas associated 
with determining whether it was the norm that shaped the actions of the state, or vice 
versa.  
By process tracing the events surrounding the preventive attacks on Osirak and 
Al-Kibar, this thesis has two broad aims: first, to contribute to the body of knowledge on 
counter-proliferation behavior by synthesizing two divergent traditions of international 
politics, and second, to provide policymakers with a better understanding of how 
international norms can influence counter-proliferation and military policy. To 
accomplish these two interrelated goals, this thesis is organized as follows. The second 
chapter reviews the relevant literature on international norms to provide a theoretical 
framework for observing their influence on state behavior. The third chapter examines 
the three norms of focus—sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation—to 
understand their interrelated and divergent purposes. The fourth and fifth chapters focus 
on the empirical cases of this research—Osirak and Al-Kibar respectively—applying the 
framework of norms to develop a mid-level bounded theory on how norms influence 
preventive attack. Finally, this thesis concludes by describing the limitations of this 
theory and offering further avenues of research. It will also examine the policy 
implications of these findings, highlighting ways to use this research as both a predictive 
tool and strategic guide. 
  
                                                 
34 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Studies 25 (2008): 6. 
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II. CAPTURING THE INFLUENCE OF NORMS 
Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one. 
—F.A. Hayek35 
 
Norms are ubiquitous yet mysterious.36 They are essential to international 
relations, mediating interactions between states and offering expectations that can be used 
as a heuristic for behavioral response. At times, norms have a constraining quality, 
demanding a behavior that seemingly contradicts rational interests.37 Norms also have a 
constitutive quality, demarcating groups of shared interests and identifying rogue 
states.38 International norms are not always followed; in fact, it is the breaking of norms 
that often makes us take notice, creating a cacophonous mixture of disbelief, distress, and 
outrage. Violations of norms, however, do not necessarily diminish their relevance or 
value.39 Rather, the condemnation and sanctioning leveled against violating states 
highlights the effect norms have on behavior. Although the degree to which norms truly 
matter is debatable, the logic of this thesis is founded on the epigraphic statement made 
by economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek: men are inherently attuned to follow 
norms.  
Defining international norms can be a difficult undertaking. Although 
international norms have been a persistent thread throughout research in world politics, 
the study of norms has failed to coalesce around a single, unifying theory. Constructivism 
focuses on the constitutive quality of norms and how they impart a sense of identity on 
                                                 
35 Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1973), 11. 
36 Geoffrey Brennan et al., Explaining Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
37 Andrew Cortell and James Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact 
of International Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 451–78. 
38 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in 
National Security,” in The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics, 33–79 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 54. 
39 Jeffrey Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure of Institutionalism,’” International 
Organization 51 (1997): 35. 
 14 
the actors that adhere to them.40 Liberal institutionalism concentrates on the constraining 
feature of norms and emphasizes how norms can limit short-term utility maximizing 
choices in exchange for long-term cooperative behavior.41 Finally, rationalism treats 
norms as a stable equilibrium to a multi-equilibria situation, in which norms allow 
players to achieve the highest pay-off in dominant and mix-strategy games.42 This 
cataloguing is not comprehensive of all approaches, but it highlights the ontological 
difficulty in studying norms and their effects.  
To account for the variation in studying international norms, it is important to 
break down norms by their essential characteristics. Based on a review of the literature, 
this thesis argues that five fundamental characteristics can be found throughout all 
international norms: regularity, ethical character, sanctioning component, constitutive 
quality, and a relationship with self-interest.43 First, norms are characterized by regular 
and consistent behavior. Second, they feature an ethical character that defines the 
appropriate behavior for a situation. Third, norms also have a sanctioning component that 
punishes actors who violate the prescriptions of appropriate behavior. Fourth, norm-
following behavior has a constitutive feature that bestows a sense of identity to actors. 
Finally, norms have a relationship—at times congruent while at times opposed—with 
self-interest. These five characteristics offer a framework for understanding the divergent 
nature of international norms—how they can provide both a constituting effect that 
defines actors as well as a regulatory effect that constrains them.  Furthermore, these 
characteristics offer a means to observe the effects of the norms of sovereignty, 
                                                 
40 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); 
Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
41 Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables.” International Organization 32, no. 2 (1982): 185–205; Andreas Hasenclever, Theories of 
International Regimes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
42 Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation and Welfare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986); Morrow, James D. “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus 
Information.” International Organization 48 (1994): 387–424; Axelrod, Robert. “An Evolutionary 
Approach to Norms.” The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1095–1111. 
43 Four of the five characteristics (regularity, normativity, sanctions, and relationship with self-
interest) are drawn from Goertz and Diehl’s typology of international norms presented in their quantitative 
research of the anti-colonialism norm. See Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl. “Toward a Theory of 
International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement Issues.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, 
no. 1 (1992): 634–64. 
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intervention, and non-proliferation. The ethical character, sanctioning component, and 
constitutive quality of norms lead to corresponding mechanisms of legitimizing action, 
gradualist strategies, and communitarian division, and by understanding the inner-
workings of each mechanism, researchers can parse out the influence of international 
norms on state behavior.   
A. REGULARITY AND PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 
The most prominent feature of a norm is that it is characterized by a regular and 
consistent pattern of behavior. Janice Thomson contends that international norms are best 
described by the statement that “only that ‘as a rule’ states engage in such practices.”44 
Put simply, norms are normal behavior. Norms do not have to be followed perfectly, but 
by definition the presence of a norm implies a repetitive action given a specific situation 
or choice. As Axelrod notes, a norm exists when actors “usually act in a certain way.”45 
Norms are not deterministic indicators of future behavior, but they do offer probabilistic 
predictors of what to expect.  
Norms are not just descriptions for regular behavior, but rather, the regularity of 
behavior also helps shape norms. They are patterns of actions and reactions between 
states that are “codified and ritualized over time.”46 It is the consistent and dynamic 
interaction of actors that gives norms their content and identity. They are often portrayed 
as intersubjective or shared understandings, which Farrell explains as meaning that norms 
“are beliefs rooted in and reproduced through social practice.”47 Norms are not simply 
arrived at one day and declared to be present and true, but rather they develop over time 
and are molded by the actions and reactions of the actors who practice them. The 
intersubjective quality of norms parallels with the constructivist logic of George Wendt, 
who argues that agents shape the structure of the system as much as the system shapes the 
                                                 
44 Janice E. Thomson, “Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis,” International 
Journal of Group Tensions 23 (1993): 81. 
45 Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” 1095. 
46 Annika Bjorkdahl. “Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological 
Reflections.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2002): 13. 
47 Theo Farrell. “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program.” International 
Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2002): 49. 
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actions of agents.48 In the case of international norms, it is not just norms (structure) that 
shape states (agents) but also, the interactions between states that shape norms. This 
sense of shared expectations also corresponds to rationalist approaches that treat norms as 
equilibria.49 Repeated coordination games produce norms that result in the best outcome 
for each player.  
B. ETHICAL CHARACTER 
Beyond the routine and regular, international norms are also characterized by the 
sense of appropriateness they provide to a pattern of behavior. A critical ethical, moral, or 
deontological component is inherent in all norms and separates them from simple social 
practices or conventions.50 Put simply, norms are normative.51 Although behavioral 
regularity is an important part of norms, it is not the whole story. Ann Florini contends 
that the ‘regular and consistent’ approach to norms propagated by rationalist scholars 
falls short of capturing what norms are truly about.52 By defining norms as patterns of 
behavior, there is no means to delineate between that behavior guided by short-term 
interests and that behavior guided by normative principles. Instead, she argues that it is 
the ethical kernel within norms that makes them “analytically distinct” and that the term 
‘norm’ is best described by a sense of oughtness and obligation.53 For constructivist 
scholars, it is the ‘standards of behavior’ and not the ‘patterns of behavior’ that give 
norms their enduring character.  
                                                 
48 Alexander Wendt. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” International 
Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 335–70; Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); For a realist critique, see Dale C. Copeland. “The 
Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism.” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 187–212. 
49 Goertz makes an important point that not all patterns of behavior are norm-driven and that single 
equilibrium games do not involve norms. Rather, it is the presence of multiple-equilibria in a situation that 
creates norms for the players. See footnote in Gary Goertz, International Norms and Decision Making: A 
Punctuated Equilibrium Model (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 57.   
50 Brennan et al., Explaining Norms, chap. 2; Goertz and Diehl, “Toward a Theory of International 
Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement Issues,” 638. 
51 This should not lead to the conclusion that normative theory is the study of norms. Although the two 
have obvious overlap, as will be discussed later in this chapter, they are not completely synonymous with 
each other.  




International norms have a reasoning all their own and often force states to make 
choices that differ from those suggested by rational choice. In their new institutionalism 
approach to international political dynamics, March and Olsen distinguish between two 
different patterns of logic: the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness.54 
The first pattern is based on the rationalist wisdom of utility-maximizing behavior that 
forces a state to weight the costs and benefits of a given choice for a specific situation to 
determine how to best advance its interests, whether material or ideational. In contrast, 
the logic of appropriateness relies on international norms that forces a state to examine its 
current situation, focusing on the obligations it has and the permissions, prescriptions, 
and proscriptions for that situation. By answering these questions about what is right and 
wrong, states are often drawn to a different outcome than if they had asked a question 
formulated around self-interest.  
The normative approach to norms does not completely decouple from the 
rationalist approach. Gary Goertz treats norms as a form of deontological logic that 
explains the appropriate action for a specific situation.55 International norms provide the 
answer to an if/then statement: given situation X, a state should respond with action Y. 
From this perspective, norms can be characterized into three fundamental types—
permissions, prohibitions, and prescriptions—that form the building block for all 
normative behavior. Goertz deems these the ‘three Ps’ and writes that “permissions state 
that an option is allowed, neither prescribed nor prohibited. Prohibitions exclude the 
choice option. Prescriptions chose an option.”56 Even from a rational perspective, norms 
clearly contain a degree of appropriateness or oughtness. 
A vital consequence of the normative characteristic is that it offers legitimacy to 
the actions of norm followers, as well as norm enforcers. The concept of legitimacy in 
international relations, like norms themselves, is often difficult to define.57 Thomas 
                                                 
54 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 943–69. 
55 Goertz, International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model, chap. 3. 
56 Ibid., 39. 
57 Gelpi claims that legitimacy is more difficult to define than the concept of power. See Gelpi, Power 
and Legitimacy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 13. 
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Franck describes a rule as being legitimate when it “exerts a pull toward compliance on 
those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution 
has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of 
right process.”58 Actors adhere to legitimate rules because they judge that other actors 
have accepted those rules as well. Finnemore notes that “legitimacy or normative 
authority” are what give rules and norms sustainability and allows them to endure, more 
than force or material power.59 It is telling indicator that she uses the term legitimacy and 
normative authority interchangeably in this context. 
C. SANCTIONING COMPONENT 
The ethical component of a norm is insignificant unless there is a means to punish 
violators who fall outside the scope of appropriate behavior that the norm prescribes. 
Norms have long been viewed as a method of social control, and from this perspective, 
an inherent linkage exists between norms and sanctions. When Axelrod claims that 
individuals “usually act in a certain way,” he closes this statement with the point that they 
“are often punished when seen not be acting in this way.”60 Norms are not just regular or 
appropriate behavior, but they are also regulated behavior. Sociologist J. Scott argues that 
“norms and values will in turn be defined in terms of sanctions … a norm is a name for a 
pattern of sanctions.”61 Sanctions are essentially the building blocks of norms. However, 
sanctions do not have to be continually present; just the fear of them can be enough to 
make norms effective. Jon Elster highlights how norms become internalized, describing a 
norm as “the propensity to feel shame and to anticipate sanctions by others at the thought 
of behaving in a certain way.”62 The power of norms is that when they become 
internalized, they force actors to comply through self-sanctioning.  
                                                 
58 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 24. 
59 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, 2. 
60 Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” 1097. 
61 John F. Scott, Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), 65. 
62 Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 105. 
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The relationship between norms and sanctions brings the concept of power to the 
forefront of normative analysis. For a norm to be effective, an actor or group of actors 
with power must be willing to use coercion or force to compel obedience.63 In the 
international system, this means that either a hegemon or a group of states must be a 
prepared to punish violators. International norms can rely on a variety of enforcers, but 
those enforcers must be willing and capable when actors fall outside the scope of 
behavior prescribed by norms. The precondition of ‘willing and capable’ is not always 
easy to meet—sanctions can be costly.64 They carry with them the chance of retribution 
from the state that is being sanctioned. Moreover, even if an actor believes they will be 
effective, sanctions still require the expenditure of material and political capital that can 
be costly and time consuming. 
The presence of sanctions often forces states that violate norms to seek ways to 
avoid being caught, to take gradual steps up to the point of violation, and to justify their 
actions to escape being penalized by the international community. Norm breaching 
frequently takes a clandestine path. Mervyn Frost makes the case that one of the basic 
indicators that a norm is settled, or recognized, by the larger community is that 
encroachment of that norm is usually undertaken surreptitiously.65 Furthermore, states do 
not usually break a norm immediately, but rather, they take graduated steps to achieve the 
outcome they seek before fully violating the norm.66 In the international arena where the 
norm of sovereignty is widely held, states will often take incremental steps before 
intervening with force in the affairs of another state. This gradualism can take the shape 
of diplomatic engagement, economic sanctions, or even covert action; however, 
regardless of form, attempts to resolve the dilemma typically do not openly violate the 
norm.  
                                                 
63 Bjorkdahl, “Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections,” 
14; See also Renee de Nevers, “Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement.” 
International Studies Review 9, no. 1 (2007): 53–80. 
64 Brennan et al., Explaining Norms, 45; See also James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between 
Anarchy and the Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
65 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 106. 
66 Ibid., 174. 
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D. CONSTITUTING IDENTITY 
Alongside their ability to restrict and sanction, international norms have a 
constitutive characteristic that provides an identity to states. Norms do not simply 
constrain a state’s behavior based on tradition, ethics, or morality, but rather, they also 
provide an element of distinctiveness, character, or persona to a state. Put simply, norms 
tell us who we are. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the most agreed upon description of 
a norm is that it is “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”67 
It is the ‘given identity’ portion of their description that highlights the constitutive feature 
of norms. The constitutive characteristic is shaped and reinforced by a norm’s pattern of 
regular and consistent behavior. A state that follows a norm is in essence defined by that 
norm; however, this defining quality takes time to develop.68 A norm provides a 
constitutive effect by recognizing a state’s identity based on its habitual actions.69 
International norms bestow a national identity on states that is different from 
those created by other, more permanent characteristics. National identity is often based 
on a state’s predominant ethnicity. North and South Korea have a distinctiveness based 
on the culture of their populations. Geography can also confer a sense of identity on a 
state. Island nations have an individuality shaped by their reliance on maritime trade and 
the protection afforded by the sea. In contrast to ethnicity or geography, the constitutive 
nature of norms provides a sense of identity that is based on behavior. States are defined 
by their actions in a situation or, more specifically, by their choice of action or decision-
making.70 It is this decision-making that defines states and places them within groups: 
states that supported slavery and colonialism, states that signed the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or states that respect the sovereignty of their 
                                                 
67 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), 891. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” 5. 
70 Ibid., 56; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 5–6; Richard K. Herrmann and 
Vaughn P. Shannon. “Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and 
Perception in Decision Making” International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001), 623. 
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neighbors. Unlike ethnicity or geography, a state’s behavior can change over time, and 
therefore the identity conferred by that behavior can also change.  
The sense of national identify that norms create also provides a sense of 
community. Norms not only define an actor, but rather, they create a shared identity for a 
group of actors. Moreover, international norms also delineate those states that rest outside 
of a group. This function of dividing members from outsiders corresponds to the tradition 
of normative international relations theory known as communitarianism. Communitarians 
argue that “membership in particular communities, and participation in their practices, 
are morally defining.”71 It stands in opposition to the cosmopolitan tradition, which 
argues for a “global sphere of equal moral standing” and contends that culture, ideology, 
or any other defining characteristic can create a class of disenfranchised outsiders.72 The 
communitarian tradition argues that a state gives preference to other states that share its 
customs, behavior, and ideology—and conversely have less concern for those states that 
fall outside their behavioral community. The constitutive quality of norms creates both a 
national identity and a behavioral community, forcing states to make decisions that give 
favor to members over outsiders. 
E. RELATIONSHIP WITH SELF-INTEREST 
The final characteristic of international norms is the ambivalent relationship they 
have with self-interest. At times, norm-following behavior appears well aligned with an 
actor’s self-interest. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a 
clear example of this sort of behavior: states generally observe maritime norms because 
they provide an efficient form of economic cooperation and violations would likely 
                                                 
71 Toni Erskine, “Normative International Relations Theory,” in International Relations Theories: 
Discipline and Diversity, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 2nd ed., 36–57 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 43; For a fuller reading on the communitarian and cosmopolitan traditions, 
see Molly Cochran, Normative Theory of International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
72 Erskine, “Normative International Relations Theory,” 42-43. The distinction between 
communitarianism and cosmopolitanism can be seen in their opposing views on state borders. To the 
cosmopolitan borders are nothing more than instrumental tools for the efficient allocation of resources, 
while the communitarian views borders as a moral tool that divides ‘us’ from ‘them.’   
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damage a state’s reputation.73 At other times, adhering to a norm stands in almost direct 
opposition to the self-interest of an actor. The anti-colonization norm that emerged 
following the Second World War took away material wealth and power, which were 
considered essential to many European states; yet these states began to follow the new 
standards of behavior even against their self-interest.74 Unfortunately, it is near 
impossible to succinctly describe the relationship between international norms and 
national interests, other than to highlight its contradictory nature. This difficulty is 
indicative of the struggle that international relations theorists have had in explaining 
norms and their effects. 
The correlation with self-interest is perhaps the most contested feature of norms 
within the study of world politics. Some constructivist scholars argue that norms are 
synonymous with national interests; the constitutive quality of normative ideas shapes 
interests, so norms cannot logically be in conflict with interests.75 Bjorkdahl makes the 
point that norms are “interconnected with self-interest” and that the two “are mutually 
constitutive.”76 From this perspective, norms create interests. Some rationalist scholars 
have a similar view, arguing that norms provide preferences for actors and that self-
interested behavior is simply following these preferences. From their point of view, 
interests align with norms. However, other scholars maintain that norms constrain self-
interest. Both neorealism and neoliberalism contend that norms alter the cost-benefit 
analysis of a state, constraining the choices available to foreign policy decision-makers.77 
Along the same lines, constructivists like Florini argue that the “realm of conceivable 
behavior in a given social structure is normatively determined and it is not as wide as the 
realm of behavior that is physically possible.”78 From their standpoint, norms containing 
and restraining self-interest  
                                                 
73 Goertz and Diehl, “Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement 
Issues,” 640. 
74 Ibid, 646-647. 
75 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 26–27. 
76 This point tracks with Wendt’s agent-structure dynamic discussed in the regularity sub-section.  
77 Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” 365. 
78 Ibid., 366. 
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The divided visions of international norms and national interests are not without 
overlap, and the debate, to some degree, is more a difference in focus and semantics than 
in philosophy. The constraining feature of norms is no different from the constraining 
feature of material power. Within the international system, states are limited by their 
relative military or economic strength compared to other states. Their relative strength 
provides a restraint much like that provided by norms. States are limited in what they can 
accomplish, whether by ethics, wealth, or military power—these limits naturally run in 
opposition to national interests. Moreover, the constitutive quality of norms and the 
preference setting quality of norms are analogous to each other; the constructivist notion 
of identity is simply an alternative description for the rationalist notion of preferences. 
From this perspective, identity and preference are two interchangeable terms.  
F. AN EXPLORATORY FRAMEWORK 
Norms are pervasive throughout the international system, yet puzzling and 
paradoxical at the same time; nevertheless, they offer a distinct lens to examine how 
states interact. Although competing traditions of international politics disagree about the 
nature and strength of their explanatory power, most agree that norms have an effect on 
states. Constructivists focus on how norms constitute the identity of a state and shape 
their actions. Institutionalists concentrate on how they constrain a state’s choices and 
limit the range of acceptable behavior. Finally, rationalists emphasize how norms serve as 
preferences for actors and how those preferences produce an equilibrium outcome in 
strategic interactions. Concerning how international norms shape counter-proliferation 
decision-making, this section advances the research on two fronts. First, it provides a 
base of knowledge to examine the specific international norms—sovereignty, 
intervention, and non-proliferation—that are the focus of this research. Second, it offers a 
framework to capture the effects of these norms in the case studies of preventive attack.  
 Reducing norms to their fundamental components not only provides a means to 
understand how they work, but more importantly, it offers a framework to observe the 
influence of norms on state behavior. The first (regularity) and fifth (relationship with 
self-interest) characteristic are somewhat open-ended descriptors that can apply to 
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numerous phenomenon in world politics, but they both impart an appreciation for the 
uncertain and shifting aspects of norms that makes them difficult to study. The concept of 
regularity highlights the dynamic nature of norm development, emphasizing how actors 
can shape norms just as much as norms can shape actors. The concept of a relationship 
with self-interest—at times opposing and at times congruent—underscores the 
ambiguous link between international norms and national interests.  Although these two 
characteristics do not provide a convenient heuristic to observe the effect of norms, they 
are important for the empirical investigation of this thesis because they highlight how 
changes in the international system can have an influence on norms. However, the three 
middle characteristics (ethical character, sanctioning component, and constitutive quality) 
do offer a practical means to breakdown the inner-workings of individual norms and 
provide the framework that this thesis will use to capture the influence of the norms of 
sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation.  
Each of these three central characteristics has a corresponding mechanism that 
influences state behavior. First, the ethical characteristic provide legitimacy to states that 
follow norms or enforce them. Second, the sanctioning component forces states to take 
gradual steps before openly violating a norm. Third, the constitutive quality creates a 
sense of community between states, often leading to a distinct ‘us versus them’ 
communitarian divide. These three mechanisms—legitimization, gradualism, and 
communitarianism—provide a starting point to observe the influence of sovereignty, 
intervention, and non-proliferation on preventive attacks. As described in Table 1, each 
mechanism has corresponding indicators through which the influence of norms can be 
observed. Legitimization forces states to justify their actions based on ethical grounds 
associated with specific norms. Gradualism pushes states to take incremental steps, often 
via diplomacy and covert action, prior to openly violating a norm. Communitarianism 
creates a divide between norm-following and norm-violating states, often furthering their 
enmity. With these indicators in mind, this thesis now turns to the three norms of interest 
to understand these mechanisms in the context of sovereignty, intervention, and non-
proliferation.   
 25 
Table 1.   Framework to Capture the Influence of Norms 
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III. SOVEREIGNTY, INTERVENTION, AND NON-
PROLIFERATION 
All decision is a matter of compromise. 
—Herbert Simon79 
 
The title of this thesis, “Norms in Conflict,” is a phrase that evokes two distinct 
lines of reasoning. First, it suggests that there are international norms for inter-state 
conflict—prescriptions and proscriptions for how states conduct themselves in war and 
lesser military engagements. From the treatment of prisoners of war to the ban on 
chemical weapons, states generally adhere to agreed-upon standards of conduct on the 
battlefield. These rules might not always be followed and they might change over time, 
but they exist nonetheless. Second, the title alludes to the point that these norms are often 
in conflict with each other—international norms do not exist separate from each other 
with clear lines to delineate when one applies over the other. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention is not just a ban on the use of chemical weapons, but rather, it denies its 
signatory states the opportunity to develop or stock specifically identified chemical 
agents as well.80 This constraint is a clear infringement on a state’s sovereign right to 
decide what happens within its borders. The norms of conflict exist, but they occur in a 
persistent state of struggle and with each other over primacy and purpose for a specific 
situation. The arena of conflict between international norms—foreign policy—is thus a 
game of compromise.  
Beyond international norms conflicting with each other, the characterization of 
each also has a struggle all its own. The definition of a particular norm is never 
unequivocal. First, norms are not on/off switches for actors to follow or not follow; they 
encompass a continuum of behavior that is deemed acceptable. States “usually act in a 
                                                 
79 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations, 4th ed. (London: Collier Macmillan, 1997), 5. 
80 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (1992), article IV. 
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certain way,” but a range of actions can be indicative of that behavior. Moreover, norms 
are rarely internally consistent, with straightforward guidelines to be followed in a 
mechanical if/then sequence. Instead they are in conflict with themselves: what 
sovereignty means to one state is different than what it means to another. Adding to this 
inconsistency is the fact that individual norms change over time. The non-proliferation 
norm has a different character now than it did during its formative years in the 1970s. 
The conciliatory nature of international norms is not just a trade-off between two 
conflicting options—rather, it also involves a compromise over the demarcation and 
scope of each norm.  
How do international norms shape and constrain decisions to conduct preventive 
attacks to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Before answering this research 
question, it is crucial to narrow the scope of this inquiry to a specific set of international 
norms. This chapter advances this focus by providing background on the central norms in 
this area of foreign policy decision-making: the norms of sovereignty, the norms of 
intervention, and the non-proliferation norm. It is imperative to have an appreciation of 
the norms at play in preventive attack decision-making, both to understand how they 
interact with each other and to recognize their own internal conflict. This section does not 
attempt to resolve the inherent conflict between international norms, nor does it seek to 
provide a definitive answer on the breadth and depth of each norm. Instead, it offers the 
reader a baseline understanding of each norm, similar to the level that foreign policy 
decision-makers have when diving into issues of world politics.  
A. SELF-DETERMINATION VERSUS SELF-HELP 
The concept of sovereignty in world politics is principally focused on the idea of 
self-determination. Sovereign states have de facto autonomy over their actions; they are 
“territorial units with juridical independence” and “are not formerly subject to some 
external authority.”81 Finnemore argues that sovereignty is the “foundational principle of 
international law” and that it corresponds directly with the central ethic of self-
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determination.82 This does not mean that outside actors do not have influence within the 
internal affairs of a sovereign state—sovereignty is a bounded concept. External actors, 
with their own mix of power and preferences, can limit the autonomy of another state. 
However, sovereignty grants that these actors will not breach or control the domestic 
political authority within a state. From this standpoint, the term sovereignty is 
interchangeable with non-intervention, a concept that has been well codified in 
international treaties and law.83  
Sovereignty, however, is a borderline concept that has a paradoxical nature.84 It is 
not only the obligation of external states to respect the internal workings of their 
neighbors, but it is also the obligation of that neighbor to be capable of maintaining its 
territorial integrity and internal political workings. The concept of anarchy that 
characterizes the international system specifies that there is no supranational agent to 
enforce territorial integrity or political autonomy; therefore, individual states are 
burdened to maintain their autonomy through self-help. This corresponds with Carl 
Schmitt’s declaration that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”85 Although 
Schmitt is discussing the concept of domestic sovereignty, his point rings true in the 
realm of world politics as well. Self-determination is not a natural right, but rather 
something that must be achieved and defended. Additionally, what constitutes self-
determination is not just a question of mutual recognition versus self-help, but it is also 
tied to the question of domestic political legitimacy and how a state provides self-rule for 
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its body politic. Communist states hold that totalitarianism is the correct path to self-
determination, while Western states argue for democracy.86 
Beyond the debate over what constitutes self-determination, scholars also disagree 
over the extent of sovereignty. Sovereignty is not a singular rule; rather, it is a set of 
prescriptions about how the international system does or should work. Krasner notes four 
distinct types of sovereignty. This term can refer to interdependency, meaning that a state 
has the ability to regulate the movement of “goods, capital, people, ideas, or disease 
vectors” across its borders.87 Sovereignty can also denote the domestic political structure 
that holds authority and regulates behavior, such as those discussed by political theorists 
like Hobbes, Bodin, and Schmitt.88 It can reference the Westphalian or Vattelian concept 
of the “exclusion of external sources of authority.”89 Finally, it can follow the 
international legal principle of mutual recognition.90 Additionally, the concept of 
sovereignty can also be used to bundle a set of rules that provide a vast normative 
framework for the international system. Frost argues for eight norms of sovereignty—
ranging from the preservation of the society of sovereign states being a moral imperative 
to the importance of self-determination for the individual citizens within a state.91  
B. VIOLATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Intervention straddles the line between violation and enforcement. Much like its 
contrapositive, sovereignty, intervention is a borderline concept within world politics that 
has a heavy degree of contradiction. Stanley Hoffman notes that intervention has the 
same purpose as any other foreign policy tool—to “make you do what I want you to do, 
whether or not you wish to do it.”92 Drawing heavily from international law, Hedley Bull 
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offers the more refined description that intervention is the “dictatorial or coercive 
interference, by an outside party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign 
state.”93 Simply put, intervention is a violation of sovereignty. Finnemore notes this 
relationship when she writes that intervention “establishes boundary conditions for [the] 
two central institutions of international life, sovereignty and war.”94 From this 
standpoint, intervention serves as a limitation for both the end of sovereignty and the 
beginning of war. Although generally held to be illegal and immoral, both lawyers and 
moralists agree that intervention is justified at times.95 It can be undertaken as a means of 
self-defense or as a mechanism for enforcement or sanctioning. It is this pattern of 
justified action, with both frequency and consistency, that transforms intervention into an 
international norm. 
The range of actions that fit under the auspices of “dictatorial or coercive 
interference” is vast. Bull provides a brief classification of the potential polar opposites of 
behavior that fit the bill: interventions can be forcible or non-forcible, direct or indirect, 
and open or clandestine.96 Although this thesis uses the broad term “intervention” to give 
the norm a name, the focus of this research is bounded to the coercive use of force short 
of war—not simply economic sanctions but rather an open use of military power against 
another state. The norms of intervention—when it is appropriate to intervene and when it 
is not—began to develop in Europe between the 17th to 18th century as part of the Balance 
of Power system.97 By the start of the 19th century it became acceptable to intervene for 
two broad reasons. First, states could use military force on the European continent to 
prevent the rise of a powerful state, thus preserving the balance of power and averting 
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war.98 Intervention was considered justified if it maintained continental order and, by 
extension, international order. Second, intervention was sanctioned to impose European 
values upon “uncivilized” states outside of the continent and keep open international 
trade with those states.99 The phrase “gunboat diplomacy” was used to describe this type 
of intervention that was conducted across the globe, in Latin America, the Middle East, 
Central Asia, and East Asia.  
The role—and norms—of intervention as an enforcement mechanism have also 
changed over time. Intervention has always been tacitly linked to the exceptions of 
sovereignty, yet how states “differentiate and constitute these exceptions are not always 
clear and have varied over time.”100 Finnemore notes how changes in purpose and the 
normative value caused some forms of intervention to fall out of practice, such as the use 
of military force to collect sovereign debt that ended in the early part of the 20th 
century.101 Likewise, the balance between sovereignty and intervention has always 
continually shifted back and forth. Historians in the late 19th century believed that 
intervention was becoming a natural and legal limit to sovereignty, arguing that it was no 
longer “outside the pale of the law of nations” but rather “an integral and essential part of 
it.”102 However, unbeknownst to most of the scholars of the time, the swing of the 
pendulum had reached its apex. From the First World War onward, sovereignty became a 
reinforced principle, as seen with the termination of colonial empires and the increased 
power of the “non-aligned” states.103 
The episodic changes to the practice of intervention have created a set of distinct 
rules that define the norm. First, the basic quality of any intervention is that it is 
undertaken by a superior actor or coalition of actors against a weaker state.104 
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Intervention is not a surprise attack or harassing behavior by a weaker actor, attempting 
to coerce a favorable outcome that it could not achieve through a force-on-force 
engagement; rather, it the mighty forcing its will on the meek. Additionally, intervention 
is an attempt to bring about a political change without disturbing the national boundaries 
of state or attempting to acquire new territory.105 Intervening states are not trying to 
redraw the border lines of an international map; they are seeking to alter a state’s 
behavior. Finally, intervention demands that states justify their use of force from an 
ethical or moral standpoint. Finnemore writes that justification is “an attempt to connect 
one’s actions with standards of … appropriate behavior.”106 Supporting this point, 
intervention is traditionally considered more justified if it is undertaken as a multilateral 
enterprise versus a unilateral endeavor.107 
C. ENMITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION 
The norm of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is concentrated on 
managing enmity within the international system. This statement seems somewhat 
obvious—certainly all norms limiting a particular type of weapon (nuclear, chemical, 
land mines) or a specific class of military force (assassination, mercenaries) are about 
controlling hostility. However, while most norms of this nature are focused on limiting 
the availability of a particular weapon or of a means of warfare, the non-proliferation 
norm attempts to both constrain access to nuclear weapons while also harnessing their 
deterrent value. William Walker writes that following the scientific “enlightenment” that 
created nuclear weapons, the last half of the 20th century was focused on creating an 
“international order which would limit their dangers, while exploiting in controlled ways 
their capacities to discourage war.”108 The non-proliferation norm posits two conflicting 
arguments that are equal in both rational and deontological logic. From one perspective, 
nuclear weapons are immoral and horrendous weapons that could lead to a pandemic-
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level of carnage. Conversely, from another point of view, nuclear weapons cannot be 
forgotten away and their limited presence can have a stabilizing effect on inter-state 
conflict. Nuclear weapons can provide peace, or they can become the sturdy child of 
terror.  
Unlike the cases of sovereignty and intervention that had international treaties 
codified around their practices, the non-proliferation norm was established on the basis of 
international law. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
signed in 1968, is the founding text for the non-proliferation norm. World powers—and 
nuclear weapon states—forged the NPT following the concerns for the unchecked spread 
of nuclear technology that came from the Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s and the 
fears of an inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapons states.109 The NPT has 
three lines of effort to curtail nuclear weapons proliferation.110 It aims to prevent the 
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the five established nuclear weapons 
state (United States, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union/Russia, and China). It limits 
the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons among the five de jure nuclear weapons 
states by setting a goal of disarmament. Further, it establishes an unalienable right to 
peaceful nuclear energy for signatory states in good standing with the aims of the treaty. 
Put in the vernacular of norms, the NPT prohibits state-to-state proliferation, prescribes 
disarmament, and permits the peaceful use of nuclear technology.111 
The Schmittian concept of enmity in world politics provides a useful optic to 
understand the non-proliferation norm.112 According to Schmitt, the “political” is defined 
by the social grouping of actors into friends and enemies, and states obtain their identity 
and their reasoning for political action based upon this division.113 From this point, he 
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offers three levels—conventional, true, and absolute—of enmity that distinguish the 
degrees of animosity states feel toward each other. Conventional enmity exists when 
states recognize each other as either friends or enemies and develop cooperative 
strategies to ensure their survival. It stands opposed to true or absolute enmity—those 
based on an asymmetric hatred felt by an insurgent or terrorist toward a more powerful 
ruling regime that is marked by a lack of mercy.114 The non-proliferation norm attempts 
to establish a social convention in the realm of conventional enmity. States can oppose 
each other; however, by creating limits to both vertical and horizontal proliferation, the 
nonproliferation norm offers a sense of fairness to all states and prevents hostility from 
falling to the level of true or absolute enmity. Moreover, the continued presence of 
nuclear weapons with the most powerful states leverages conventional enmity—through 
the practice of deterrence—to limit the outbreak of war. 
D. LIMITATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
International norms are sometimes in conflict with each other. The line where the 
norms of sovereignty end is defined by the norm of intervention, and vice versa. 
Moreover, beyond international norms battling each other, the characterization of each 
also has a struggle all its own. The norms of sovereignty grant autonomy and the right of 
self-determination to states within the international system. However, sovereignty in an 
anarchical system is not a natural right; rather, it must be maintained through self-help. 
The norm of intervention—more specifically the coercive use of military force—is a 
direct violation of sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is often undertaken to maintain stability 
within the international system. Intervention attempts to force a state to change its 
behavior without affecting its territorial integrity or its ruling regime. Additionally, 
intervening states traditionally justify their actions based on an ethical imperative, such as 
self-defense or human rights. The norm of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not 
just focused on limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, but rather, it also attempts to 
leverage the deterrent value of those weapons already produced. All three international 
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norms are intractably interlinked. Sovereignty serves as a limitation for intervention. 
Non-proliferation acts as a justification for intervention. Conversely, intervention 
functions as a sanctioning tool for non-proliferation. The interaction of these norms 
creates conflict for state leaders, which ultimately leads to compromise in foreign policy 
decision-making. 
The interwoven and conflicting aspects of sovereignty, intervention, and non-
proliferation provide a starting point to explore the two case studies of Osirak and Al-
Kibar—preventive attacks that were undertaken to counter the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Returning to the framework explained in the previous chapter, it is now 
possible to describe specific indictors—and likely observable manifestations—of the 
three normative mechanisms within the context of each norm. As described in Table 2, 
the opposing norms of sovereignty and intervention create a communitarian divide 
between those states that respect the territorial integrity and political autonomy of other 
states and those states that violate the sovereignty of others without following the rules of 
intervention. Concern over being sanctioned will lead states to take gradual measures 
before openly violating either norm—often through diplomacy, propaganda, or covert 
action. Furthermore, states will justify their norm-violating behavior as a requirement to 
defend their own sovereignty against an existential threat. The non-proliferation norm 
also creates a communitarian divide between those states that support its precepts and 
those states that proliferate or support proliferation. The norm also forces states with a 
nuclear ambition to take a clandestine path to acquire nuclear weapons. Additionally, a 
dominant still will often justify its coercive behavior as a means to enforce the non-
proliferation norm.    
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Table 2.   Indicators of the Influence of the Norms Sovereignty, Intervention, 
and Non-proliferation 
 Sovereignty Intervention Non-Proliferation 
Communitarianism 
division based on those states that follow the 
norms of sovereignty/intervention and those 
that violate those norms 
division based on 
states that support 
non-proliferation 
and those that 
proliferate 
Gradualism 
fear of sanctions forces states to use 
diplomacy, propaganda, and covert action 





Legitimization justification to defend sovereignty against an existential threat 
justification for 












IV. OSIRAK CASE STUDY 
[Statesmen and diplomats] refuse to consider certain ends and to use 
certain means, either altogether or under certain conditions, not because in 
the light of expediency they appear impractical or unwise, but because 
certain moral rules interpose an absolute barrier. 
—Hans J. Morgenthau115 
 
On June 7, 1981, Israel conducted the world’s first preventive attack against a 
nuclear facility that was apart from an ongoing war.116 Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-16 and 
F-15 jets flew over 1,000 kilometers through Arab territory to destroy a French-built 
Osiris-type reactor, dubbed “Osirak,” before it could go “hot” and be used to produce 
plutonium in its fuel rods. Departing from Etzion air base in the Sinai, the eight F-15s and 
eight F-16s flew at low altitude across the Gulf of Aqaba, through southern Jordan and 
then northern Saudi Arabia, before crossing into Iraq. Upon arriving twenty miles 
southeast of Baghdad at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, each F-16 climbed to 
5,000 feet before diving to drop two 2,000 lbs Mk-84 bombs onto the recently finished 
nuclear site. During the bombing run, the eight F-15s established a combat air patrol to 
intercept any Iraqi fighters who might be dispatched. Although the dropped ordnance was 
unguided, at least eight of the 16 bombs struck the large containment dome of the reactor, 
completely destroying the nuclear site while leaving the surrounding area largely 
undamaged. After finishing the attack, the strike force climbed to a high altitude and 
departed Iraq, crossing through Jordan its way home to Israel. Operation Opera, as the 
attack was named by the IAF, was a success.  
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Israel’s triumph at Osirak has led both scholars and policymakers to focus on the 
attack as a calculated and singular action that was steeped in realpolitik and machtpolitik 
thinking. Israel faced a rising and potentially existential security threat to its national 
interests and dealt with it in a practical manner. Although this analysis provides an 
adequate explanation for the attack, it betrays the fact that the raid was part of a larger 
battle to deny Iraq a nuclear weapon. Israel’s preventive campaign to forestall Iraq’s 
nuclear ambitions did not start nor end on that fateful Sunday in 1981. Rather, the attack 
was the apex of a pattern of actions that included both private and public diplomacy 
efforts as well as covert operations to sabotage production of the reactor and to 
assassinate Iraqi scientists associated with the program.117 Furthermore, describing the 
Osirak raid as a practical policy decision based on Israel’s national interests understates 
the overwhelming risk of the operation and the consequences it could have provoked. 
Israel national security leaders, led by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, calculated that 
Israel would endure condemnation and sanctions from the international society; however, 
they could not predict how the United States—the country’s chief security benefactor—
would respond to the IAF’s use of American warplanes for the strike.118 Additionally, 
Begin took a serious individual political risk when he authorized a mission that was far 
from guaranteed success. Not only was Begin facing a parliamentary election three weeks 
after the attack—which he would likely have lost if the attack had failed—but he was 
also confronted by strong dissent from members of his own cabinet over the efficacy of 
the attack.119  
If the preventive attack on Osirak was not an assured success that made it the 
overwhelming rational choice, then why did Israeli leadership choose this uncertain path? 
Moreover, if the Iraqi nuclear reactor was such a looming security threat to the state of 
Israel’s existence, why did its leaders wait so long to attack the site, almost till the month 
before it was about to become active? This thesis argues that the answer to these two 
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interrelated questions can be found in the crucial role that international norms—
sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation—played in shaping and constraining 
Israel’s behavior against Iraq. By analyzing the events surrounding the strike through the 
lens of the components of each norm, it is possible to observe their mechanistic influence 
on Israel’s foreign policy throughout the counter-proliferation campaign. First, the 
constitutive characteristic of each norm created a strong communitarian divide between 
Israel and Iraq, enabling Israeli policymakers to view their rivalry as an existential battle 
that diminished the influence of the norms of sovereignty and non-proliferation. Second, 
the sanctioning component of each norm forced Israel to take gradual and incremental 
action to deter Iraq’s nuclear ambitions and shaped much of its overt and covert 
engagement prior to the preventive attack. Third, the ethical quality of each norm forced 
Israeli leaders to justify their actions in a specific manner to legitimize their violation of 
Iraq’s sovereignty. This chapter concludes by drawing together these three mechanisms 
of communitarianism, gradualism, and legitimization into a bounded mid-level theory, 
connecting the inner-workings of each to explain Israel’s preventive attack on Osirak. 
What this thesis uncovers is that the moral rules, as alluded to by Morgenthau in the 
epigraphic opening, played just as important a role in influencing Israel’s actions as did 
expediency and national interests. 
A. EROSION OF CONCERN 
The constitutive characteristic of norms provides states with a distinct identity in 
the international system. The description that norms are “a standard of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity” infers that by adhering to a norm a state gains a 
specific behavioral identity.120 To this end, when states respect the norms of sovereignty, 
they inter-subjectively create the most basic sense of identity for each other—the 
characteristic of having autonomy over the internal affairs within one’s borders. By 
November 1975 when France and Iraq signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, Israel had 
achieved this identity as a recognized state in the international system. Established in 
1948, Israel required a great deal of self-help at the onset to maintain its territorial 
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sovereignty, immediately defending itself in the First Arab–Israeli War of 1948 against 
an Arab coalition that included Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Following 
its victory during the pre-emptive Six Day War of 1967 and its success during the War of 
Attrition from 1967 to 1970, Israel continued to demonstrate its resolve to be a sovereign 
Jewish state within the Middle East.  
In the wake of its victory during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 against Egypt and 
Syria, Israel transitioned from being autonomous based solely on self-help to also being 
secured by the acceptance of its Arab neighbors. This acceptance was formalized with the 
Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria that ended the Yom Kippur War 
in 1974, as well as the continued negotiations between Egypt and Israel that culminated 
with the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. Although hostilities continued, the 
relationship between Israel and its neighbors had transitioned from one of absolute 
enmity that was based on animosity over the existence of a Zionist state, to a 
conventional enmity that was largely a struggle over territorial gains and the rights of the 
Arab-Palestinian population. Israel had confirmed its identity as a member of the 
international society.  
The constitutive nature of norms also provides a persona to norm-violating states 
as well. Nations that continually disregard the norms of sovereignty are often 
characterized as “rogue” states whose actions fall outside the bounds of appropriate 
behavior. By the mid-1970s, Iraq had achieved this status based on its pattern of behavior 
toward both Israel and other neighboring states over the previous 30 years.121 At the time 
of the May 14, 1948 proclamation that formally declared the establishment of Israel, an 
Iraqi military force was already engaged with the nascent Israel Defense Force (IDF) in 
the Jordan Valley. Following Israel’s victory during the First Arab-Israeli War, Iraq 
refused to partake in the Armistice Agreement of 1949 that ended hostilities. Instead of 
recognizing and dealing with the Israeli state, Iraq chose to completely withdraw its 
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troops and turn over its controlled areas to the Jordanian Arab Legion. While its 
neighboring Arab states began to begrudgingly accept the continued presence of Israel 
over a 30-year period, Iraq clung to a strong pan-Arab ideology that refused to accede 
that a “Zionist entity” could be part of the greater Middle East. From Israel’s perspective, 
Iraq’s continual disregard for the Jewish state’s sovereignty and existence placed Iraq 
outside the circle of international society.  
The behavioral identity created by norms leads to a demarcation of community 
between norm-following states and norm-violating states. This communitarianism divide 
not only creates a morally defining character for states but also provides a powerful lens 
to gauge and determine their interactions and relationships with other states.122 
Communitarian thinking helps to formulate the foreign policy of a state by giving 
preferences to members of the community over outsiders and by framing decisions from 
an us-versus-them mentality. Inter-state policies are not judged on their universal merit, 
but rather, through the optic of what is appropriate behavior toward a member of the 
community and toward an outsider. By the time of the announcement of the French-Iraq 
nuclear deal in 1976, the communitarian divide between Iraq and Israel was already 
strong, and while Israel had normalized relationships with other major Arab states, like 
Egypt and Jordan, it still experienced a great deal of absolute enmity from Iraq. Although 
the nuclear exchange agreement between France and Iraq was for a power and research 
reactor—which Iraq was entitled to as a signatory state of the NPT—it was clear to Israel 
and the rest of the world that the Osirak reactor could allow Iraq to achieve nuclear 
weapons status by reprocessing spent uranium fuel rods into weapons grade plutonium.  
Israel’s communitarian thinking toward Iraq only sharpened from 1976–1981, as 
Iraq’s nuclear ambitions formalized and gained momentum. Iraq’s denial of the mere 
presence of Israel, and by extension its sovereign rights, was continually affirmed by 
members of the ruling Baath party. In 1978, the Iraqi Ambassador to India, Jihad Karim, 
privately commented that “Iraq doesn’t accept the existence of a Zionist state in 
Palestine” and that “the only solution is war.”123 During a 1980 interview with the 
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Lebanese news journal Al-Jumhur al-Jadid, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sa’dun Hammadi 
publically echoed the same sentiment, stating that “Iraq cannot agree to the existence of 
Zionism - neither as a movement nor as a state. … The Arab nation cannot agree to the 
amputation of any part from its body … because the land of Palestine is an Arab land and 
we cannot conceive giving it up. … The struggle against Zionism is for us a struggle in 
which there can be no compromise.”124 If there were any doubts as to the Iraqi 
government’s position toward the sovereignty of Israel, in 1980 Deputy Prime Minister 
Tarik Aziz simplified it by stating that “we want the whole of Palestine … [and] we 
recognize neither the 1967 borders nor the 1948 partition borders.”125  
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s own public statements served to embolden 
Israel’s communitarian thinking. Prior to his rise to the presidency, Hussein had already 
made claims against the continuation of Israel, declaring during a 1977 interview that 
“never shall [Iraq] recognize Israel’s right to exist as an independent Zionist state.”126 In 
1980, as the President of Iraq, he openly declared to the United Nations General 
Assembly that “the Zionist entity is not considered a state, but a misformed entity which 
holds Arab territories.”127 Still, perhaps the most disconcerting statements made by the 
Iraqi government came after Iran’s attempts to destroy the Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Site 
during in 1980 during the Iran-Iraq War. After the failed air raid, senior Iraqi government 
official went out of their way to de-emphasize the threat that a nuclear Iraq would have 
on Iran. Deputy Prime Minister Aziz told a Jordanian reporter that Iraq’s primary war 
efforts were directed at Israel and not Iran. Moreover, the official Baghdad newspaper ran 
an editorial a few days later that explained “the nuclear reactor cannot be a threat to Iran 
because Iraq looks upon the Iranian people as brethren. … The Zionist entity is the one 
that fears the Iraqi nuclear reactor … [it] constitutes a grave danger for ‘Israel.’”128 
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The statements above provide only a sampling of Iraq’s hostile attitude toward 
Israel; the totality of Hussein’s and his subordinates’ declarations were far reaching and 
continuous. Whether these statements were truthful representations of Iraq’s enmity 
toward Israel and its true nuclear intent are both debatable, and it could easily be argued 
that Hussein was attempting to placate his own domestic audiences or alleviate the 
concerns of his warring neighbor; however, neither of these points mattered to Israel. 
From an Israeli perspective, the litany of anti-Zionist statements made by Iraqi senior 
leaders only deepened the communitarian divide between Israel and Iraq, further 
demarcating the difference between Middle Eastern states that acknowledged Israel and 
the Iraqi state that threatened its existence. As Iraq’s vitriol against Israel increased, 
Israeli concerns for Iraq’s sovereignty decreased, and foreign policy decision makers also 
began to falter in their belief that the non-proliferation norm could restrain Iraq.129  
Communitarianism served as the first normative causal mechanism that slowly 
eroded Israel’s concerns for the international norms of sovereignty and intervention and 
influenced its decision to conduct a preventive attack against Iraq. First, the constitutive 
quality of sovereignty created a sense of identity for norm-following states, like Israel, 
and for norm-violating states, like Iraq. These opposing identities led to a communitarian 
divide between the two states that intensified after the public announcement of Iraq’s 
nuclear ambitions, furthering the enmity between the two states and creating a cycle of 
communitarian thinking. Communitarian thinking, in turn, weakened Israeli leaders’ 
concerns for Iraq’s sovereignty because they did not view Iraq as part of the inter-state 
society. Communitarian thinking also relaxed the limits against intervention, leading 
Israel to contemplate unilateral action to forestall Iraq’s proliferation. Additionally, the 
non-proliferations norm’s ability to manage enmity between rival states was placed in 
jeopardy, leading Israel to consider reinforcing the norm through sanctioning.  
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B. DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND COVERT ACTION  
The sanctioning component of norms forces states to seek gradualist and covert 
approaches before fully violating a norm. If actors will be “punished when seen not to be 
acting in a certain way,” then they will attempt to achieve the same results both by taking 
incremental actions that gradually approach the line of violation and by undertaking 
veiled actions that, while violating the norm, cannot be attributed to the violating states. 
Following a September 1975 visit by Saddam Hussein to Paris, French Prime Minister 
Jacque Chirac stated, “Iraq is now building its own nuclear program, and France desires 
to take part in this endeavor.”130 This public pronouncement formally solidified the 
Franco–Iraqi nuclear cooperation agreement and caused Israeli national leadership to 
weigh the benefits of reigning in Iraq’s nuclear ambitions with the costs it might incur 
from the larger international society. Israel feared the threat to its security posed by a 
nuclear-armed Iraq; however, it also feared the condemnation and punishment it might 
face by openly violating the norms of sovereignty and intervention with a direct strike 
against the Osirak nuclear reactor.  
International norms played a crucial role in restraining Israel from taking 
immediate action against the Iraqi nuclear program. The norms of sovereignty and non-
intervention mandated that Israel respect Iraq’s territorial integrity, as well as its domestic 
political undertakings. The norms of intervention demanded that Israel not only justify its 
encroachment on Iraq’s borders but also that it seek multilateral partnerships for such 
actions. Moreover, the non-proliferation norm and its founding statute, the NPT, worked 
against Israel by setting a higher bar for justifying any intervention to halt Iraq’s purchase 
of the Osirak reactor. Although the NPT proscribed non-nuclear weapon states from 
obtaining nuclear weapons, it also prescribed that those same states were entitled to 
peaceful nuclear technology. Therefore, Iraq’s purchase of the French Osiris-type 
reactor—although later proven to be an attempt to circumvent the NPT—was guaranteed 
and legitimized under the non-proliferation norm.131  
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Parallel to Iraq’s attempt to clandestinely violate the non-proliferation norm, 
Israel also began a gradual campaign to avoid punishment for violating the international 
norms of sovereignty and intervention while still thwarting Iraq from achieving its 
nuclear goals. To achieve its goals without being sanctioned, Israel’s diplomatic and 
national security services took incremental steps that came close to breaking international 
norms, and when actual violations were deemed necessary, those steps were undertaken 
covertly to obfuscate Israel’s involvement and allow for credible deniability.132 The arc 
of Israel’s gradualist counter-proliferation campaign can be observed on two continuums: 
from the private to public steps it took to deter Iraq’s efforts and from the nonthreatening 
to coercive methods it used prior to openly bombing the Osirak reactor. Along the 
private-to-public continuum, Israel began with private diplomatic efforts to influence 
France and Italy to end their nuclear arrangements with Iraq to eventually use public 
diplomacy to sway international opinion against Iraq. On the nonthreatening-to-coercive 
continuum, Israel gradually moved from peaceful diplomatic efforts to covert sabotage 
and assassination in order to slow Iraq’s nuclear aspirations.  
Israel’s private diplomacy was a multi-faceted effort, focusing not just on 
influencing Iraq’s nuclear partnership with France—and later Italy—but also on engaging 
with other regional players and hegemonic powers to avert Iraq from achieving nuclear 
weapons status. First, in early 1977, Israel began private diplomatic exchanges with 
France to assert its concerns that supplying highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Iraq was 
troublesome by itself. Moreover, the greater fear was that the Osirak reactor would be 
used to produce weapons grade plutonium by reprocessing spent reactor fuel. However, 
by March of that year, these exchanges had proven unfruitful and France denied that the 
uranium it supplied could be used to make a nuclear bomb.133 In January 1979 during a 
visit to Paris, Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan again raised these concerns with French 
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national leaders, but received no positive response.134 At this juncture, gradualism forced 
Israel to shift its approach to more coercive and public tools of influence, as described 
later in this section; however, Israeli foreign policy leaders continued to apply diplomatic 
pressure on France even while taking other incremental steps toward violating the norms 
of sovereignty and intervention. 
In July 1980, newly appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir held a 
spirited meeting with the French charge d’affaires, Jean-Pierre Chauvet, during which 
Chauvet promised that France would maintain strict supervision over Iraq’s nuclear 
program to ensure it was not being weaponized. Israeli senior leaders, however, were 
doubtful of France’s ability to uphold this guarantee, a sentiment that only increased 
when Iraq removed IAEA inspectors following the start of the Iran–Iraq war in 
November of that year.135 Even after an October 1980 national security meeting, at 
which point Begin concluded that a preventive strike was the only option, the Israeli 
prime minister still pushed for continued mediation with France. During discreet 
meetings, Israeli diplomats persisted to impress upon their French colleagues that France 
should abandon its agreement with Iraq. Unfortunately, France continued to counter with 
apologetics that the uranium supplied could not be used for military purposes and that the 
reactor would be under French and IAEA oversight.136 
By February 1978, Italy had also entered Israel’s diplomatic crosshairs, following 
the announcement of a contract between the Italian Atomic Energy Committee and an 
Italian company, Societa Nazionale Industria e Applicazioni (SNIA) Viscosa, to build a 
plutonium extraction laboratory at the Al-Tuwaitha nuclear site.137 Although this lab was 
professed to be for research, Israel had little doubt of its true purpose. In July 1980, 
Foreign Minister Shamir sent a handwritten letter to the Italian Parliamentarian Emilio 
Colombo, urging Italy to abandon its agreement and highlight the inherent danger of a 
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nuclear capable Iraq.138 It took until September for Israel to finally receive a response 
from Italy, and the return message was of a character that Israel had become acquainted 
with from countries dependent on Iraq’s oil exports, vacillating between a denial of Iraq’s 
belligerent motives and a defense of its right to peaceful nuclear technology.139  
Israel’s attempts at a discreet diplomatic solution were not just directed at France 
and Italy, but also at regional players, starting with secret meetings in 1977 between 
Israeli foreign affairs officials and Iranian generals and culminating with the 1980 
discussions between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and West German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt.140 However, Israel’s most fervent private diplomacy was reserved for the 
United States. This effort first began in 1975, when Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made 
it clear to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that a nuclear-armed Iraq was a critical 
threat to Israel and asked that the U.S. government exert pressure on France to end its 
nuclear discussions with Iraq.141 By the summer of 1980, Israel had intensified its 
engagement with the United States, with Israeli Ambassador Ephraim Evron meeting 
with senior leaders in the U.S. State Department and with Prime Minister Begin 
maintaining a close dialogue with U.S. Ambassador Samuel Lewis.142 Begin went so far 
as to share sensitive intelligence directly with Lewis and requested that the U.S. President 
directly ask the French to stop sending enriched uranium to Iraq.143 Unfortunately, by 
December of that year, it was clear that the influence of the United States over France 
and Italy was subordinate to each state’s dependence on Iraqi oil.144 
After a pattern of unsuccessful private diplomatic engagements, Israeli leaders 
began to use more public approaches to compel Iraq. In 1980, the Foreign Affairs and 
Defense Committee of Israel’s Parliament, the Knesset, agreed on a propaganda 
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campaign to inform the population of Western countries of the threat posed by a nuclear 
armed Iraq.145 In the spring of that year, information was leaked to the New York Times 
and the Washington Post that described how Italy was selling nuclear equipment to Iraq 
and training Iraqi engineers at Italian nuclear research centers.146 Although aimed at 
publically shaming Italy into forgoing its deal with Iraq, the leads had little actual 
consequence. In July 1980, the previously restrained Israeli national press began 
releasing stories with headlines such as “A Nuclear Arab Bomb: A Casus Belli for 
Israel?” to draw greater attention to the looming security dilemma.147 In September 1980, 
Israel’s public diplomacy transitioned from propaganda to prophetic warning, when 
Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori told American news that “if it is impossible 
to halt the Iraqi program by diplomatic means, Israel will have to reconsider its 
options.”148 Finally, at an international symposium on science and disarmament being 
held in Paris in January 1981, Israeli Knesset member and scientist Yuval Ne’eman 
openly denounced France for its nuclear cooperation with Iraq.149 
Interspersed between the failed private diplomacy and public propaganda 
campaign, Israel also conducted covert action to impede Iraq’s nuclear proliferation. 
First, on 6 April 1978, only a few months after a failed diplomatic visit by Israeli Foreign 
Minister Dayan, an explosion occurred at a building for the Constructions Industrielles de 
la Mediterrance (CNIM), the French company that was building the reactor cores for the 
Al-Tuwaitha site. Although Israel never claimed responsibility for the sabotage, the 
explosion took place three days before the reactor cores were to ship to Iraq, and it has 
become widely believed that Mossad was responsible for the bombings. Then, on 14 June 
1980, the Egyptian scientist Yahya El-Mashad, who was working for Iraq’s nuclear 
agency on the Osirak project, was murdered in a Paris hotel room. When Parisian police 
attempted to investigate his death, they discovered that a key witness—a French 
                                                 
145 Ibid., 131. 
146 Ibid., 115. 
147 Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad, 54. 
148 Nakdimon, First Strike, 147. 
149 Ibid., 179. 
 51 
prostitute who had admitted to purposefully harassing El-Mashad on the night of his 
death—was involved in a fatal traffic accident a few days later.150 Finally, on 7 August 
1980, three bombs exploded in Rome at the offices and staff apartments of SNIA 
Viscosa, the Italian firm that Iraq had contracted to provide plutonium extraction 
equipment.151 Although all of these actions were clear violations of sovereignty, each 
was done in a covert manner to avoid being attributed to Israel.  
Gradualism served as the second normative causal mechanism, guiding Israel to 
take slow but deliberate actions to prevent Iraq from becoming a nuclear weapons state 
without openly violating international norms. First, the sanctioning component of the 
norms of sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation forced Israel to respect Iraq’s 
territorial borders and its internal domestic pursuits, including its right to peaceful nuclear 
technology. Israel could not immediately intervene with open use of force to halt Iraq’s 
nuclear ambitions without risking strong international condemnation and punitive 
sanctions. This fear of punishment led Israel foreign policy-makers to take an incremental 
approach. First, they engaged in non-threatening, private diplomacy with regional 
neighbors and international players. Following the continued failure of private 
diplomacy, Israel turned to more public actions, such as public media campaigns, and 
more coercive activities, such as covert sabotage and assassination. All these graduated 
steps slowed Iraq’s ability to obtain nuclear technology; however, they were unable to 
prevent France from building the Osirak reactor at the Al-Tuwaitha nuclear site.  
C. CHOOSING BETWEEN TWO EVILS   
The ethical quality of international norms provides states with a heuristic for what 
actions are morally permitted, prohibited, and prescribed. It is their inherent 
deontological value that moves norms beyond basic patterns of repeated behavior to 
standards of appropriate behavior. States gain legitimacy for both their norm-following 
and norm-enforcing actions by adhering to these rules of appropriateness. Conversely, 
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when states act in ways that are normatively ambiguous or deviating, they will attempt to 
frame their actions as moral imperatives. To this end, when a state violates the 
sovereignty of another, it will defend its action by stressing the illegitimate behavior of 
its adversary and by creating a narrative that its intervention was norm-enforcing rather 
than norm-breaking. Following the bombing of Osirak on 7 June 1981, Israel embarked 
on the final stage of its counter-proliferation efforts, framing its preventive attack as 
legitimate compared to the proscribed behavior of Iraq. 
Preceding the attack on Osirak, the international norms of sovereignty, 
intervention, and non-proliferation had coalesced into a set of intertwined and often 
contravening principles. Respect for sovereignty prohibited military incursions across 
state borders, providing states a degree of self-determination. The rules of intervention 
prescribed that the use of force should be legitimate, multilateral, and not focused on 
altering territorial boundaries. Finally, the non-proliferation norm permitted abiding 
states the right to peaceful nuclear technology. At the same time, and in opposition to 
these guidelines, the norms of sovereignty also justified self-help—a state was permitted 
to violate another’s sovereignty to preserve its own existence. Intervention was an 
allowed technique of self-help and was often used to maintain the balance of power. 
Furthermore, the use of force was also a tool for norm-enforcement—permitting 
interventions that upheld the prohibition against nuclear proliferation. 
Throughout their deliberations over Iraq’s nuclear program, Israeli national 
security leaders continually discussed an attack not only from a balance of power 
perspective but also from a normative context of anticipatory aggression. During a 
cabinet meeting in August 1978, Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin spoke for the 
concerns of many dissenting ministers by emphasizing that a preventive strike on Iraq 
could be used by other states to justify an attack on Israel.152 However, no discourse 
more clearly characterized this normative debate than the final decision meeting 
convened by Prime Minister Begin with his national security and cabinet on 14 October 
1980. Begin framed the decision of whether to attack as a choice between “two evils.”153 
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The first evil was attacking the nuclear site and violating Iraq’s sovereignty, an action 
that could lead to a war with Iraq and that would likely damage Israeli’s promising 
relationship with Egypt. The second evil was refraining from action and allowing Iraq to 
become a nuclear weapons state. Following a majority vote, Israel decided it would 
choose the “first evil,” and following the attack, it justified its actions based on this moral 
framework.154 
After the bombing of Al-Tuwaitha surfaced, Israel publically acknowledged the 
attack by taking responsibility and justifying its actions. Prior to launching the raid, 
members of Begin’s cabinet agreed to not acknowledge the attack until it was reported in 
open press – on the chance that Iraq might conceal the fact that the reactor was destroyed. 
However, after the attack was broadcast by Jordanian news services, Israeli senior 
officials, led by Begin, began their public justification. First, the Israeli government 
released a public statement detailing how the Osirak reactor was being built to openly 
violate the NPT. The statement also highlighted Iraq’s continued aggression toward Israel 
and the existential threat a nuclear armed Iraq would pose to the Jewish state.155 
Additionally, it underscored the restrained choice of attacking the reactor before it was 
operational, avoiding a nuclear fall-out on the innocent residents of Baghdad.156 The 
official Israeli government statement was not an apology for violating international 
norms, but rather, it was a defense of Israel’s appropriate behavior. At a press conference 
two days after the attack, Begin reaffirmed this sentiment by declaring that “Israel has 
nothing to apologize for” and then proceeded to recount Hussein’s reprehensible actions 
over the past decade.157 
Following the initial public justification of the attack, Israel continued to 
legitimize its actions by engaging in private and public justification campaigns. During 
his interactions with members of U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s national security team, 
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Israeli Ambassador Evron emphasized Israel’s gradual steps to deter Iraq and reminded 
U.S. policymakers of their own efforts to dissuade France and Italy from supporting 
Iraq.158 Furthermore, Israeli officials relied on historical analogies to buttress their 
legitimizing discourse with the international community. Prime Minister Begin’s first 
press conference was littered with references to the Holocaust. Members of the Knesset 
openly drew parallels between Osirak and the Cuban missile crisis. Senior parliament 
member Moshe Arens commented that “had the Russians not capitulated over the 
missiles emplaced in Cuba, the Americans would ultimately have taken action against 
them.”159 His point was emphatic; Israel’s adversary had forced it to take that fateful 
preventive step, while the United States’ opponent had not. On 14 June 1981, Began 
addressed the American public with an open letter, in which he declared that “evil should 
be punished” and a “just caused should triumph.”160 His narrative was a continuation of 
Israel’s normative framing of its attack on Iraq—evil should be sanctioned, while 
justified action should be legitimized. 
Legitimization served as the third normative causal mechanism, guiding Israel to 
frame its behavior as either norm-following or norm-enforcing. The established norms of 
sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation provided an ethical context from which 
Israel evaluated its decisions to act against Iraq. Israeli leaders understood their decision 
would violate Iraq’s sovereignty; however, they also perceived a nuclear-armed Iraq to be 
a greater moral concern. Following the attack, Israel first took public responsibility and 
framed it as a legitimate intervention that was forewarned based on prior diplomatic 
efforts. Then, Israeli leaders argued the attack as a necessary response to their adversary’s 
illegitimate behavior, noting Iraq’s continued opposition to the Jewish state and its 
continued hostile actions. Finally, they used historical parallels from both the holocaust 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis to further legitimize their decision to attack.  
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D. AN ABSOLUTE BARRIER? 
International norms did not impose an “absolute” barrier that prohibited Israel 
from attacking Iraq; nevertheless, they did influence Israel’s counter-proliferation 
campaign against Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions. Three interlocking normative 
mechanisms—communitarianism, gradualism, and legitimization—worked in sequence 
to shape and constrain Israel’s behavior surrounding the bombing of Osirak. First, the 
constitutive quality of norms led to strong communitarian thinking, which weakened 
Israel’s concern for Iraqi’s sovereignty and its rights under the NPT. This weakened 
concern combined with a fear of sanctions shaped the gradualist campaign to halt Iraq’s 
attempts at proliferation. After both diplomacy and covert action failed to stem Iraq’s 
nuclear ambitions, Israeli senior leaders weighed their options from competing moral 
perspectives: whether to violate the norms of sovereignty or allow Iraq to violate the non-
proliferation norm and threaten Israel’s existence. Based on these choices, Israeli leaders 
felt their decision to attack was legitimate and framed the attack as justified to counter 
Iraq’s norm-violating behavior.  
The bombing of Osirak was not caused by the norms of sovereignty, intervention, 
and non-proliferation, but rather, it was a pragmatic response, grounded in national 
interests, to a potential nuclear threat. However, along the path to that response, Israel’s 
decisions were shaped and constrained by the prevailing international norms of the time. 
Returning to the two questions that opened this chapter—Why did Israel decide to 
conduct the attack when it was not assured success and why did it take so long for Israel 
to conduct the attack with such a looming security threat?—the influence of norms 
provides a better understanding to the problems posed by these two questions. The attack 
was heavily debated by Israeli national security leaders; although some viewed it as a fait 
accompli, others felt it crossed both an ethical threshold that would weaken Israel.161 
However, the attack became unavoidable because of the strong communitarian divide 
between Israel and Iraq and the fact that Israel had exhausted its other options of 
diplomacy and covert action. International norms led Israeli senior leaders through a path 
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of options that ultimately ended with attack. Furthermore, those same norms restrained 
Israel’s initial behavior and forced it to pursue a gradualist campaign, denying 
expediency for morals. 
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V. AL-KIBAR CASE STUDY 
Politics cannot be divorced from power. But the homo politicus who 
pursues nothing but power is an unreal a myth as the homo economicus 
who pursues nothing but gain. Political action must be based on a 
coordination of morality and power. 
—E.H. Carr162 
 
On 6 September 2007, Israel conducted another preventive attack against the 
alleged nuclear program of a neighboring Arab state, this time using military force 
against Syria. However, unlike its strike against the well-publicized Osirak reactor, this 
attack was focused on destroying a covertly built gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor 
site that bore a strong resemblance to North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear research center. 
This likeness was not a coincidence; North Korean scientists and engineers had been vital 
to the construction of Syria’s reactor, which has come to be named after the small village 
where it was located—Al-Kibar.163 Leaving from Ramat David Airbase in northern 
Israel, four F-15s and four F-16s headed north over the Mediterranean Sea.164 At the 36th 
parallel, the IAF jets began a meandering route that straddled the north side of the 
Turkish-Syrian border, before finally entering Syrian airspace near the border town of 
Tall Abyad. After degrading the Syrian air-defense radar system with a combination of 
electronic warfare attacks and precision bombings, the strike force headed toward the city 
of Dayr az Zawr, resting on the banks of the Euphrates river in eastern Syria.165 For this 
attack, precision guided munitions completely destroyed the recently finished nuclear 
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reactor site, which was set to become operational within a few months.166 After the 
attack, the IAF jet bombers retraced their entry route through Turkey before returning to 
Israel. Operation Orchard, the name of the mission, had quietly achieved its desired 
effect.  
The decision to attack the Al-Kibar nuclear site was remarkably easier for Israeli 
national security leaders than the deliberation over Osirak. In March 2007, Israeli 
intelligence believed it had verified the existence of the reactor and its capability to 
produce weapons grade fissile material, at which point Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert claims that he knew the site must be destroyed.167 In April of that year, Israeli 
national security leaders briefed their counterparts in the United States and requested 
support for a combined action against the facility.168 In July, U.S. President George Bush 
informed Olmert that the United States could not attack Syria without more definitive 
proof of a nuclear weapons program.169 Beyond consulting the United States, Israel did 
not take any significant steps to halt the Al-Kibar reactor from becoming operational—
there was no diplomatic effort to expose its existence, and the covert action directed 
against the facility was focused on gathering intelligence vice delaying its completion.170 
Following the attack, the details of the military strike remained hidden beyond the fact 
that Israel had bombed a target in Syria.171 Almost a month later, Syrian President Assad 
openly admitted to the attack but claimed Israel had destroyed a compound of unused 
military buildings.172 It was not until April 2008 that the United States delivered an open 
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intelligence briefing to the media, claiming that the attack was justified as a strike against 
a covert nuclear reactor site.173  
If the Osirak raid was the model for a successful preventive attack and the 
standard for appropriate action, then why did Israel’s national security leaders take such a 
truncated path in Syria—one that strayed from the established precedents? Why did they 
seek an immediate solution to this nuclear problem through the use of force, instead of 
taking the incremental steps of diplomacy, propaganda, and covert action? Furthermore, 
why did they wait so long to justify their behavior and legitimize their actions, especially 
when they had acquired strong evidence of Syria’s nuclear intent? While Israel’s actions 
at Osirak cannot be fully explained by realist thought, the attack at Al-Kibar appears to be 
lacking the equivalent normative logic of its predecessor. This chapter contends that the 
solution to this dilemma rests in the application of the structure-agent dynamic through 
which norms evolve: as the nature of conflict develops and adversarial states adjust, so do 
the norms that govern them. Therefore, given the significant shifts in the international 
system over the past 35 years since Osirak, the normative causal mechanisms that 
influence preventive strike have changed as well.  
By analyzing the events surrounding the Al-Kibar strike in relationship to the 
evolving standards of appropriate behavior, it is still possible to discern the influence of 
the international norms of sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation. The 
overarching focus of this chapter is the role that inter-subjectivity had in reshaping the 
norms that influenced Israel’s counter-proliferation behavior. First, beyond the 
communitarian divide between Israel and Syria, the loosened norms of sovereignty and 
intervention also allowed Israel to be less constrained in enforcing the non-proliferation 
norm and defending its sovereignty. Second, the shift toward opaque nuclear proliferation 
and changes to the international structure of power altered the framework through which 
Israel could take gradual action to deter Syria’s nuclear ambitions. Third, the turn toward 
covert nuclear proliferation also tapered the demands on Israel to justify the Al-Kibar 
attack and to legitimize its violation of Syria’s sovereignty. This chapter concludes by 
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reframing the bounded, mid-level theory developed in the previous chapter, highlighting 
how changes in international system have a corresponding effect on how norms influence 
preventive attack. It seeks to demonstrate that the coordination of morality and power, 
which E.H. Carr claims to be the foundation of political action, is never weighed on a 
permanent ethnical scale but rather, is continually rebalanced by the changing dynamics 
of the international system.  
A. REPUTATIONS AND SHIFTING LANDSCAPES  
If states are imbued with a sense of identity based on the constitutive component 
of norms, then that identity is certain to change as states interact with each other. Just as 
norms develop over time and are “rooted in and reproduced through social practice,” the 
behavioral identities of states also evolve through social interactions in the international 
system.174 Changes to a state’s behavioral identity can come from both the individual 
agent level of the state and the structural level of the international system, and these 
changes are often a synthesis of these two levels of influence. A state’s identity can be 
altered because of agent-level decisions, such as choosing to follow or breach norms 
based on domestic political choices. Likewise, a state’s identity can be altered by factors 
outside of its control, as international norms are strengthened or weakened and the state’s 
actions are reevaluated based on these shifting standards of appropriateness. By 2006, 
when it confirmed that the Syrian government had built a disguised nuclear reactor plant 
in its eastern province, Israel had become an established member of the international 
community. It had achieved this identity first through self-determination, stemming from 
its continued peace agreements with regional players such as Egypt and Jordan, and its 
strong relationship with the unipolar system leader, the United States.175  
Israel also cultivated a reputation for pursuing self-help behavior—a status it 
achieved through the defense of its territorial sovereignty and its propensity for 
intervening when its sovereignty appeared threatened. Foremost, Israel’s foreign policy 
                                                 
174 Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” 49. 
175 Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, “Primer on Palestine, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” 
(Washington, DC: Middle East Research and Information Project, 2014). 
 61 
toward nuclear proliferation had become characterized by the Begin doctrine—the 
declared policy that it would not tolerate its enemies “to develop weapons of mass 
destruction against the people of Israel.”176 Furthermore, Israel had extended its 
intervening behavior beyond preventing nuclear dangers toward deterring threats posed 
by regional terrorist organizations. On 3 October 2003, it violated Syrian sovereignty 
when it attacked a Palestinian terrorist training camp located outside of Damascus, 
retaliation for a suicide bombing in northern Israel the previous day.177 From its 
inception, Israel’s sovereignty had been maintained through self-help rather than 
bestowed to it through its neighbor’s respect for its self-determination. Israel continued to 
cultivate its dominant character trait of defending its existence, preventively when 
necessary.  
In contrast, Syria had drifted from being an accepted member of international 
society to being more aligned with rogue states and belligerent transnational 
organizations. During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980, Syria began to align itself with Iran, in 
part because the ruling family led by President Hafiz Assad was from the Alawites 
branch of Shia-Islam. This Shia religious identity matched with the Persian population of 
Iran, and helped foster a security alliance against each state’s Sunni-dominated 
neighbors.178 Acting in concert, the two states ensured regional instability by forcing 
U.S. peacekeepers out of Lebanon in 1984 and frustrating Israeli efforts to quell the 
Palestinian insurgency in Lebanon throughout the 1980s and 90s.179 Syria’s disruptive 
behavior largely stemmed from its support of the Lebanese Shia-Islamic militia 
Hezbollah and the Palestinian political and terrorist organization Hamas; both of which 
had goals to contravene Israel’s security.180 Syrian hostility toward Israel reached a 
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highpoint during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, when it provided training, equipment, 
and funding to Hezbollah fighters as part of the month-long conflict in Lebanon and 
northern Israel.181 Israel viewed Syria’s repeated use of proxy forces against the Jewish 
state as a clear indicator of its absolute enmity. Moreover, Syria’s growing relationship 
with Iran—another staunch supporter of anti-Israel proxy forces—only added to this 
concern.182 
The truth behind the mysterious Al-Kibar site that Syria had constructed only 
intensified this communitarian divide. In early March 2007, officers from Mossad, 
Israel’s national intelligence agency, surreptitiously entered the Vienna residence of 
Ibrahim Othman, the head of Syria’s Atomic Energy Commission, to obtain sensitive 
information from Othman’s computer. They discovered pictures of the nuclear reactor 
that matched North Korea’s Yongbyon-model reactor. Moreover, these photos showed 
North Korean engineers and scientists working at the site.183 Syria’s deliberate 
circumvention of the non-proliferation norm was only matched by its collusion with 
North Korea, the definitive rogue state. Additionally, Syria’s continued relationship with 
Iran, which at this point was suspected of its own covert nuclear program, placed Syria 
into the category of rogue state. In early 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
visited Syria and pledged more than $1 billion in assistance so that Syria could bring its 
nuclear weapons program online.184 By the time Israel had confirmed Assad’s nuclear 
intent, Syria’s persistent norm-breaching behavior left Israel with a clear communitarian 
leaning that weakened its already limited concerns for Syria’s sovereignty. 
While this communitarian divide was fermenting in the mid-2000s, Israel also 
found itself in a shifting normative landscape that had altered the norms of sovereignty, 
intervention, and non-proliferation since the 1981 Osirak attack. The fall of the Soviet 
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Union in 1991 left the international system in a unipolar state, compared to a bi-polar 
structure that balanced the competing powers of the two Cold War rivals.185 The terrorist 
attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, coupled with the belief that 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq possessed WMD, had also increased concern for the rising threat 
posed by non-state actors, ungoverned territories, and rogue states. With its invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States sent a clear message to the international 
community that the preventive use of force was justified to halt the rise of these 
threats.186 This turn toward anticipatory military power had cascading effects on the 
moral underpinnings that governed appropriate behavior. Concerns over sovereignty were 
clearly loosened, especially against rogue states or WMD threats, resulting in decreased 
restrictions on intervening behavior.187  
During this same post-Cold War timeline, the non-proliferation norm also 
fluctuated due to the emergence of an opaque proliferation trend.188 Pakistan became a 
declared nuclear weapons state in 1998 with a series of nuclear tests, demonstrating the 
potential for the illicit procurement of nuclear technology and material.189 The United 
States and India signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2005—an affront to the 
non-proliferation norm due to India’s status as a nuclear weapons state that was not a 
signatory of the NPT.190 North Korea accomplished its first nuclear weapons test in 
2006, circumventing the NPT, international sanctions, and a concerted multilateral effort 
to restrain its nuclear ambitions.191 These events, coupled with Iraq’s almost successful 
attempts to clandestinely obtain nuclear weapons technology after the Osirak attack, had 
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weakened many states’ confidence in the non-proliferation norm to contain rogue 
states.192 This undermining of confidence opened the door for increased enforcement 
through the use of force, as both a means to forestall proliferation and to punish potential 
proliferators. This adjustment to the non-proliferation norm merged with the abatement of 
sovereignty, and as Israeli senior leaders contemplated how to handle Syria’s nuclear 
goals, they found themselves less constrained than their predecessors prior to the Osirak 
raid. 
B. A SHORTENING TIMELINE AND A SHRINKING POOL 
Actors who violate norms are left with a tendency to feel shame and to expect 
sanctions from other actors.193 In the realm of world politics, these “others” are either 
other states or the international society writ large. When Israeli national security leaders 
contemplated striking Osirak, their hesitation was based on a concern for the 
condemnation they would receive from across the international system. In their 
calculation, sanctions could come from European states, like France and Italy, that had 
nuclear pacts with Iraq; from Arab states, like Egypt and Jordan, that had enduring 
security relationships with Iraq; and from strategic partners, like the United States, that 
had provided advanced military weapons and equipment to Israel. These sanctions led 
Israel down a gradualist path of diplomacy, propaganda, and covert action over a five-
year period before it openly used force. In contrast, Syria’s clandestine circumvention of 
the NPT left Israel with less than a year to deal with a rising threat. This shortened 
timeline appears to upend the logic that sanctions force gradual behavior; Israel took only 
limited private action and did not attempt public efforts to forestall Syria’s nuclear 
ambitions, at least not on the scale undertaken against Iraq. However, a deeper analysis of 
not only Israel’s actions before the attack, but also the changing the nature of 
proliferation and the shifting international power structure, reveals the subtle presence of 
gradualism. 
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Israel’s counter-proliferation campaign against Syria was not without some 
degree of gradualism, at least in its detection and preparation phase. In 2001, U.S. 
imagery intelligence took notice of construction along the Euphrates valley in eastern 
Syria and shared this information with Israeli intelligence.194 In 2004, U.S. signals 
intelligence began to notice increased communication between the North Korean capital 
of Pyongyang and Syria’s remote desert city of Al-Kibar and passed these discoveries to 
Israeli counterparts.195 Israel suspected that the facility at Al-Kibar had a nuclear 
purpose, but it had no conclusive evidence of what was happening inside the secluded 
buildings. By March 2007, this apprehension led to Mossad’s clandestine raid in Vienna 
to obtain further information from Syria’s nuclear agency chief.196 After discovering a 
nuclear reactor, Israeli national security leaders began secret discussions with their 
counterparts in the U.S. government, and Prime Minister Olmert not only sought 
President Bush’s tacit approval to bomb the reactor but pushed for the United States to 
conduct the raid itself.197 On 18 April 2007, Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz briefed 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on Israel’s updated intelligence on the Al-Kibar 
site; the briefing would be the opening salvo of a campaign for the United States to take 
action.198 Shortly afterward, Meir Dagan, Director of Mossad, traveled to the United 
States to meet with U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and Vice President 
Dick Cheney, delivering photographic evidence of the nuclear reactor and North Korea’s 
support.199 He also briefed C.I.A. Director Michael Hayden to further the awareness of 
the U.S. intelligence community.200 Shortly after President Bush was shown the photos 
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of Al-Kibar, he spoke with Olmert over the phone, during which the Israeli pointedly 
remarked to his American counterpart, “I’m asking you to bomb the compound.”201 
After months of deliberation, on 12 July 2007, Bush called Olmert to inform him 
that the United States could not attack Al-Kibar without more conclusive evidence that 
the facility was built to produce nuclear weapons.202 Bush offered to apply diplomatic 
pressure on Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to halt his attempts at proliferation; 
however, Olmert had no intention of trying either private diplomacy or public 
propaganda to halt Assad. Israel kept the United States informed of its plans to strike 
Syria, notifying members of the Bush White House in early September that the IAF’s 
preparations were almost complete.203 Additionally, Israeli intelligence officials 
informed their counterparts in Britain’s foreign intelligence service, MI6, about Syria’s 
proliferation and Israel’s pending strike. Although Israel was transparent with the United 
States and Britain that an attack was imminent, it did not disclose the exact timeline to 
either ally.204 In August 2007, Israel dared a final attempt to gather decisive evidence of 
a Syrian nuclear weapons program, inserting commando troops into the desert outside 
Dayr al Zawr to collect soil samples. Inopportunely, the recce force was discovered by a 
Syrian patrol and forced to abort its mission before it could collect further proof.205 A 
month later, Al-Kibar would be destroyed, without the forewarning of diplomacy or 
covert action that was typical of a military intervention. 
The lesser degree of gradualism before Al-Kibar can be explained by two 
substantial changes in the international system since the 1981 bombing of Osirak. The 
first change was to the nature of nuclear proliferation; states seeking nuclear weapons 
shifted from weaponizing their declared nuclear energy or research programs to covertly 
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constructing military capabilities using illicit trade and concealed facilities.206 Unlike the 
Al-Tuwaitha facility, which was veiled as a peaceful nuclear technology program 
legitimatized by the NPT, Al-Kibar was constructed clandestinely to avoid the watchful 
eyes of international inspectors and neighboring rivals. This effort meant that Israel had a 
much shorter timeline to react after discovering the intent behind the facility, six months 
compared to the five years that Israel had for Osirak. Furthermore, Syria’s opaque 
proliferation also placed limits on Israel, which feared losing its intelligence advantage. 
According to calculations by Israeli national security leaders, if Syria was confronted 
diplomatically, it would either stall for more time, delay inspections, remove evidence of 
the nuclear reactor, or declare that the reactor was only intended for peaceful purposes.207 
Additionally, Syria’s illicit trade with North Korea for nuclear material and engineering 
knowledge also limited Israel’s ability to leverage diplomatic pressure or covert action. In 
the case of Osirak, Israel was able to sabotage and disrupt Iraq’s suppliers in France and 
Italy to slow its proliferation; however, with Al-Kibar, Israel did not have the same reach 
into North Korea.  
The second change that interrupted the gradualist causal mechanism was the 
shifting structure of power in the international system after the attack on Osirak. The 
previously discussed changes to the normative landscape, which weakened the 
prescriptions of sovereignty and softened the proscriptions against intervention, played a 
role in Israeli foreign policymakers being less concerned with attacking Syria; however, 
just as significant as the relaxing of these norms was the narrowing of which states would 
enforce them. By 2006, the international system had been accustomed to the unipolar 
influence of the United States, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.208 
Moreover, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 cast the United States as 
not just a hegemonic power but also a norm enforcer that was not trepid about 
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intervention.209 Although a rising China and a revisionist Russia were willing to 
intervene with the security affairs of their respective regions, the United States was the 
only international power likely to enforce the norms of sovereignty and intervention 
across the globe. Additionally, beyond being a hegemonic enforcer, the United States was 
also Israel’s strongest security partner, meaning that any anticipatory action would likely 
require its tacit consent.  
Israel’s concern for which states could sanction its counter proliferation behavior 
shifted as the United States became the sole hegemonic power and norm enforcer. Instead 
of fearing condemnation from the greater international community, Israel was 
predominantly concerned with how the United States would respond and focused its pre-
attack efforts on securing its support. To gain U.S. backing, Israeli national security 
leaders shared sensitive intelligence with their U.S. counterparts and collaborated on 
potential responses, culminating with Prime Minister Olmert asking President Bush to 
order a U.S. attack. This yielding was a clear indicator of Israel’s deference to U.S. 
support. After the United States passed on this request, Israeli leaders continued to keep 
U.S. officials informed of their plans. Furthermore, Israel prolonged its efforts to verify 
Syria’s nuclear weapons program, even after it clearly intended to destroy Al-Kibar. This 
move, although perhaps intended to acquire stronger justification for the attack, can be 
viewed as a final attempt to solidify U.S. backing, especially since the lack of verifiable 
evidence of a weapons program was the road block preventing U.S. action. From this 
perspective, Israel’s efforts to avoid sanctions were focused on a singular constituency—
the United States. Combined with the opaque nature of proliferation, the shift toward a 
unipolar system limited the gradualist causal mechanism’s ability to constrain Israel’s 
counter-proliferation campaign attack against Syria.  
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C. COVERT PROLIFERATION, COVERT JUSTIFICATION 
The moral component of international norms offers legitimacy to state actions, 
validating both norm-following and norm-enforcing behavior. In the case of Al-Kibar, 
Syria’s disregard for the non-proliferation norm and its continued enmity toward Israel 
gave Israeli national security leaders sufficient justification to attack; they possessed 
evidence of not only a secret nuclear reactor but also of collusion with a pariah state. 
Surprisingly, however, Israel did not justify its actions with any of this evidence. In fact, 
Israel’s defense of the attack can best be described as muted: it did not take public 
responsibility, seek to explain its actions as a response to Syria’s behavior, nor offer any 
historical parallels. The lack of historical analogizing is especially significant, given 
Israel’s reputation for intervention and its preventive strike of Osirak 35 years earlier. 
Just like gradualism, the explanation for Israel’s passive legitimization can be found in 
changes to the international system, specifically the turn toward opaque proliferation. 
Following the 2007 bombing of Al-Kibar, Israel framed its preventive attack as 
legitimate; however, much like the proliferation it forestalled, it’s justifications were 
covert. 
The international norms of sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation had 
become weakened by 2007; however, they still provided an ethical framework for Israel 
to weigh its choices. Israeli foreign policymakers were again forced to decide whether to 
violate another state’s sovereignty or to allow for the presence of a nuclear threat. On 
receiving the March 2007 intelligence briefing after the Vienna raid, Prime Minister 
Olmert concluded that “the weight of [Al-Kibar], at the existential level, was of an 
unprecedented scale.”210 The Israeli leader clearly recognized Syria as a grave threat to 
the population of his nation. Furthermore, Olmert’s request for the United States to attack 
and his baulking at Bush’s offer of a diplomatic solution indicate that Israel intended to 
remove the reactor with force from the start. On 5 September 2007, Olmert’s national 
security cabinet deliberated one final time, offering its blessing on Operation Orchard and 
granting Olmert and his defense and foreign minister the latitude to attack when they 
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deemed it best.211 A day later, IAF F-16s and F-15s encroached Syrian airspace to 
destroy Al-Kibar. Although the relatively hasty decision was clearly borne out of a 
practical reasoning over national interests, such shrewdness cannot completely discount 
the ethical component of the attack. For Israel, the attack was also the balancing of 
concern for its own existence weighed against concern for Syria’s sovereignty.  
Prior to the return of the IAF bomber jets from Dayr al Zawr, Prime Minister 
Olmert called President Bush, reporting that “something that existed doesn’t exist 
anymore” and that the mission “was done with complete success.”212 Within a few days, 
disclosure of the attack expanded, with Israeli leaders reaching out to their Egyptian and 
Jordanian counterparts to inform them of Syria’s nuclear ambitions and Israel’s efforts to 
forestall those aims.213 Olmert flew to Moscow to inform Russian President Vladimir 
Putin of the attack, out of respect for Russia’s close security ties with Syria.214 Olmert 
also spoke directly with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to inform him of the 
attack and to ask him to relay a message to Syrian President Assad. Olmert conveyed that 
Israel would not allow Syria to become a nuclear-armed state; however, Israel had no 
intention of attacking any further. His message was clear: Israel intended to uphold the 
norm of non-proliferation in the Middle East. Additionally, Olmert stated that if Syria did 
not draw attention to the attack, then Israel would stay silent as well.215  
In contrast to the select states that were privately informed of the attack and its 
purpose, public information on Al-Kibar remained limited. A day after the attack, the 
Syrian Arab News Agency reported that Israeli planes had violated Syrian airspace, but 
that Syria’s air defense batteries had repelled the invading force. Three weeks later, 
Assad admitted to a BBC reporter that Israeli warplanes had struck Syrian soil, but he 
professed that the attack had been inconsequential and had only destroyed unused 
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military buildings.216 Israel held to its tacit agreement to remain silent; additionally, the 
United States did not contest this incomplete narrative. Both states were fearful that an 
open declaration of Israel’s military strength over Syria would further inflame the 
situation and could lead to war.217 Over the course of the following year, details of the 
attack emerged in the open press and speculation arose that the target had been a 
blossoming nuclear weapons facility. These conjectures were confirmed with the 24 April 
2008 briefing conducted by senior U.S. officials from the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI). During their presentation, ODNI briefers disclosed 
intelligence about Syria’s covert nuclear facility, along with further information about 
Israel’s attack and the United States’ knowledge of it. Syrian President Assad was quick 
to disavow these claims; however, his denials were eventually rebuked in June of that 
year, when IAEA inspectors were allowed to access the destroyed buildings at Al-Kibar 
and uncovered trace evidence of nuclear material.218  
Beyond the immediate concern for dampening the hostility between Israel and 
Syria, several explanations exist for why the true impetus of the Al-Kibar strike remained 
secret for so long. First, due to the silence of both Syria and Israel, little evidence existed 
that the attack even took place, meaning there was no need to justify why it had 
occurred.219 Additionally, the attack caused relatively limited collateral damage; other 
than the destruction of property and equipment, which according to Syria never existed, 
the bombing only killed between ten to thrity-six workers.220 Compared to the 2003 
Israeli bombing of a terrorist training camp in Syria or the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the 
Al-Kibar strike was relatively insignificant. Additionally, the failures of the non-
proliferation regime to peacefully enforce the NPT—as exemplified by the violations of 
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North Korea, Iraq, and Iran—led many states to contemplate whether the use of unilateral 
force was the only effective preventive measure.221 Along with these theories, the turn 
toward opaque proliferation, shifting from open technology transfers to covert 
acquisitions, also altered the need to justify counter-proliferation actions in the public 
arena. Syria’s clandestine nuclear weapons program meant that Israel had to justify its 
actions to fewer states. This shrinking pool of states altered the legitimization process for 
Israel, influencing it to take responsibility for its actions, but only to a select group of 
stakeholders. 
D. MORALITY OR POWER? 
A surreptitious entry to obtain evidence, a silent raid to destroy a secret facility, 
and a thundering silence following the attack. It is difficult to portray the campaign 
against Al-Kibar as anything but the clear exercise of power to advance national interests 
or protect against the threat of nuclear genocide. The absence of information on the strike 
itself is only rivaled by the lack of details on the deliberations made by Israeli national 
security leaders prior to it. These gaps in knowledge make it impossible to argue that 
there was an open discussion over appropriate behavior. Moreover, from an explanatory 
perspective, neither constructivism nor normative theory can contend with the realist 
perspective that the attack on Al-Kibar’s was borne out of national interests and concerns 
for the balance of power. At the same time, however, realist analysis fails to fully explain 
Israel’s behavior both before and after the strike. Post hoc, Israel’s actions might appear 
as logical, preference-following decisions—taking incremental steps to gain support of an 
ally prior to the attack and notifying key stake holders afterwards to justify its actions. 
This is what states do. But what makes these choices self-evident—what directs states to 
take gradual steps or seek to legitimize their actions? This thesis contends that part of the 
answer to these questions can be found in the influence of norms.  
International norms do not determine how states will act, but they do influence 
states, providing guidelines for behavior. Normative causal mechanisms do not discount 
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the effect of realpolitik or national interests on the behavior of states, but rather, they 
provide a fuller understanding of the pathways that states take to achieve their national 
aims. The three interlocking normative mechanisms—communitarianism, gradualism, 
and legitimization—influenced Israel’s preventive attack; however, their influence was 
loosened, truncated, and tampered due to shifts in the international system. First, the 
constitutive quality of norms and communitarian thinking relaxed Israel’s concerns for 
Syria’s sovereignty. Those concerns, however, were already weakened due to the 
loosened normative landscape and Israel’s established identity as an intervening state. 
Second, the sanctioning component of norms influenced Israel to take incremental steps 
before violating Syria’s sovereignty; yet, Syria’s clandestine acquisition of nuclear 
technology from North Korea limited the time and options available for Israel to exercise 
a gradualist strategy. Moreover, the shift toward a unipolar system narrowed the number 
of states that could sanction Israel and placed its attention on securing the support of the 
United States. Finally, the ethical character of norms and legitimization led Israel to 
frame its behavior as norm-enforcing, but due to the opaque nature of Syria’s 
proliferation, Israel only had to justify its actions to a few key stakeholders and could 
remain largely silent otherwise.  
From a theory-testing perspective, the Al-Kibar case study does not fit well with 
the model of preventive attack that can be induced from Osirak. What it does illustrate, 
however, is that the decision to attack was not a false dilemma between morality or 
power, but rather, it was a balancing between the two principles. Normative decisions, 
and their corresponding behavior, are not made in a vacuum. Carr argues that the 
coordination of morality and power is fundamental to political action, but the balance 
between those two basic principles is not determined on a fixed scale that can be equally 
applied to every situation. Rather, the coordination of morality and power is continually 
shaped by changes in the international system: the fall of a powerful state that alters the 
structure of the system, the asymmetric turn in how rogue states circumvent sanctions, 
and the shift in the ethical backdrop of what is appropriate behavior—changes that can 
strengthen or dampen the influence of norms. 
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Philosophers will not become kings nor kings philosophers except in the 
perfect city in the sky, which is not now and never will be a city of this 
world. 
—Kenneth W. Thompson222 
 
Any investigation into the realm of international norms risks becoming a 
philosophical discourse on ethics that can betray the practical aspect of statecraft. The 
study of norms collides with the widely-held tenant that anarchy is the defining 
characteristic of the international system and that national interests are the guiding 
principle of state behavior. Within the state, norms are often embodied by laws, rules, and 
regulations, which describe and enforce the standards of appropriate behavior; among 
states, however, the absence of a supranational power limits their efficacy in the 
international realm. Furthermore, the nature of war—where the rule of laws is often 
silenced—only amplifies the effects of the anarchic society.223 Many scholars and 
policymakers argue that these problems cause norms to be a poor tool of reference for 
military strategy. Furthermore, beyond this structural dilemma is the concern that the 
study of norms can easily turn from informative scholarship about the way the world 
exists to normative scholarship about how the world should exist, trading what is for 
what should be. All theories of international relations are an approximation for the 
behavior of states, but theories of norms or ethics have a greater risk of becoming 
philosophical idealizations. Kenneth Thompson, a prominent realist and normative 
scholar, emphasizes this point when he alludes to both Plato’s commentary that the world 
will be a better place when kings are philosophers and philosophers are kings,224 and to 
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Thomas More’s description of that world as a place called Utopia, the Greek word for 
“nowhere.”225  
This concern over unreliable heuristics or utopic idealizations should make both 
scholars and policymakers cautious when exploring international norms; however, 
apprehension should not limit the study of norms, especially when that knowledge offers 
greater understanding for a significant phenomenon within the international system, 
preventives attack. This thesis has taken two distinct steps to address these concerns. 
First, it emphasized that norms have a bounded explanatory capacity—their influence is 
not deterministic but does have a critical effect on state behavior. Furthermore, this thesis 
stressed that norms are more than ethical guidelines; rather, they also have a sanctioning 
effect, which follows the logic of consequence, and a constitutive quality, which can 
escalate hostility as easily as the balance of power. This thesis concludes by exploring 
both the academic and policy significance for understanding how international norms 
influence the preventive use of force to counter nuclear proliferation. First, it reviews the 
three normative causal mechanisms and the limits of their explanatory power. Then, it 
offers future avenues of research to further refine this topic. Finally, it explores the policy 
implications of these findings, examining both their predictive value and their worth for 
foreign policy decision-making.  
A. TOWARD A THEORY 
This thesis argues that three interconnected normative causal mechanisms—
communitarianism, gradualism, and legitimization—work in sequence to influence a 
preventive attack to counter nuclear proliferation. First, the constitutive quality of norms 
provides a communitarian divide between states, weakening concerns for the sovereignty 
of the proliferating state and lessening the restrictions for intervention placed on the 
regional leader. Communitarianism furthers the enmity between the proliferator and the 
preventer and increases the motivation for intervention just as much as concerns over 
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shifts in relative power.226 Additionally, the normative landscape of the time—lessened 
or increased concern for sovereignty, intervention, and non-proliferation—can serve as an 
accelerant or impediment of that motivation. Second, the sanctioning component of 
norms forces the dominant state to seek a gradualist campaign to halt its rival’s 
proliferation. Gradualism constrains the dominant state to take incremental steps—
ranging from private diplomacy to covert action—before openly violating the sovereignty 
of its adversary, in order to avoid being punished by the international community. 
However, this campaign is often shortened based on the opaqueness of the proliferation 
and the amount of time available to respond. Furthermore, the nature of that campaign is 
shaped by accessibility to the proliferator’s supporting states and by the international 
structure of power. Finally, the ethical character of norms offers a framework for the 
attacking state to justify its actions to the international community. Legitimization of the 
attack demonstrates that it was not just a calculation over the balance of power, but that it 
also involved the normative dilemma of whether to violate the norms of sovereignty or 
allow a rogue state to violate the non-proliferation norm and threaten the existence of the 
dominant state. Justification for the attack is also influenced by the international structure 
of power, with the attacking state only seeking to legitimize its behavior to specific states 
based on the distribution of power.  
Foremost, this proposed mid-level theory is bounded by the specific 
circumstances being investigated: preventive attack to counter the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. This thesis does not argue that the three causal mechanisms apply to all 
preventive attacks but rather, that they were observed in cases where a dominant state 
sought to forestall the nuclear ambitions of a rival. Empirical limitations have also 
restricted the development of this theory; breaking into the black box of a state’s 
motivations and the decision-making processes of its leaders is a difficult task. Inferences 
can be made about a state’s preventive motivations; however, it is difficult to 
disaggregate the effects of multiple motivations. The normative idea that communitarian 
thinking could spur hostility between two adversarial states runs to the same conclusion 
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as the realist concept of disproportionate power shifts. State motivations, especially 
preventive motivations, are multi-faceted and multi-causal, and cannot be reduced to a 
singular balance of power calculation nor to historical enmity. 
This methodological dilemma begs the question that if self-interest can correctly 
explain a state’s preventive motivation, then is there a need for a normative explanation? 
This is an especially valid critique given the fact that balance of power analysis offers a 
more transitive heuristic that can be quickly applied across a wide range of cases, 
compared to the nuanced approach of categorizing states by their behavioral identity. 
Although balance of power theory offers a wide ranging capacity to explain state 
behavior, as Waltz notes, the overarching power of a structural theory is not meant to 
dismiss the explanatory power of other arguments but rather, to allow scholars to focus 
on the unitary level of analysis to “search for more idiosyncratic causes.”227 By diving 
into questions of national identity and culture, researchers can observe how the 
constitutive quality of norms can overtake their restrictive nature and can lead to greater 
hostility. Understanding that an action is likely is not the same as understanding why it is 
likely; therefore, by providing a more robust explanation—one steeped not only in 
national interests but also in national identity—scholars of international politics can 
further the body of academic knowledge and provide worthwhile contributions to 
policymakers as well.  
Several steps can be taken to further refine the causal mechanisms laid out in this 
thesis. First, scholars can dive deeper into the foreign policy decision-making of Israel, 
Iraq, Syria, and the surrounding states in these two case studies. As more information for 
both Osirak and Al-Kibar becomes available, researchers can examine the discourse 
among national security and foreign policy leaders to look for further signs of 
communitarian thinking, fear of punishment, and concern for ethical justification. 
Second, scholars can look toward other case studies involving decisions to conduct 
preventive attack to counter nuclear proliferation—specifically cases where an attack was 
strongly considered but ultimately did not occur, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
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case of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, and the Iran nuclear deal framework. This 
thesis intentionally focused on building a theory based on cases that involved an attack; 
however, exploring how these causal mechanisms might have halted an attack could 
further explain their influence. Finally, researches can look beyond cases involving 
nuclear counter-proliferation toward other examples of preventive attack—such as 
attacks to prevent the spread of chemical weapons or other strategic armaments—to 
determine what parallels exist.  
B. TOWARD A POLICY 
Beyond advancing the academic body of knowledge, this thesis also offers 
guidance to policymakers. The first policy-related aim is to provide a predictive 
framework to observe the counter-proliferation behavior of other states. Although the 
United States has demonstrated its support for the NPT and the non-proliferation norm, 
this support does not mean that U.S. non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts 
will always be aligned with those of other states. By looking for the two causal 
mechanisms that precede an attack—communitarian thinking and a gradualist 
campaign—intelligence professionals and strategists can have a better sense of the 
likelihood of an attack. A state’s concerns over a rising nuclear-armed opponent are only 
intensified by historical enmity and the view that the adversary state is outside the bounds 
of one’s community. Furthermore, the investment of time and energy toward both 
diplomacy and covert action is a telling indicator of whether a state is focused on halting 
proliferation.   
Although historical tension and incremental steps might seem to be obvious 
indicators, understanding how these factors influence state behavior can add more nuance 
to their predictive value. The pattern of disregarding the sovereignty of a neighboring 
state—both its territorial integrity and right to exist—is an important driver for enmity 
and one that is not always captured by balance of power analysis. Moreover, this 
behavior highlights how the behavioral identity of an adversary can have a profound 
influence on the national priorities of a dominant state. The United States would have 
struggled to assert influence in the Middle East with the presence of a nuclear armed Iraq 
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and Syria; however, it still did not feel compelled to conduct a preventive attack against 
either state. Israel, on the other hand, not only feared a shift in the balance of power, but 
also faced an existential threat from nuclear weapons and continued hostile relationships 
with both states.  By understanding another state’s opinion of its social position within its 
region and the international system, the United States is better positioned to predict and 
potentially influence future preventive attacks.  
The nuclear latency of Japan offers a telling illustration of the value of both 
communitarianism and gradualism as predictive tools. It might be difficult to imagine 
Japan as having a nuclear motivation given its history; however, this stance could change 
if the United States abdicated its extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia. Japan holds a 
significant nuclear latency—through its nuclear fuel cycle capability stemming from its 
civilian reactors—that would greatly shorten its breakout time to become a nuclear 
weapons state.228 If Japan lost the nuclear assurance of the United States, then it could 
seek to develop a nuclear arsenal on its own. It also might be difficult to imagine China 
conducting a preventive attack against Japan; however, as a regional hegemon, China 
would be more threatened by a nuclear-armed Japan than any other state. If China 
perceived that Japan did have a nuclear motive, it would likely not only be concerned 
about a shift in the balance of power, but also the historical enmity between the two 
states. Although the United States and Japan have moved past their hostility during 
World War II to become allies, China and Japan’s enmity runs much deeper, touching on 
perceptions of national superiority and historical atrocities. This deep-seated hostility is 
unlikely to be forgotten, and it could further China’s preventive motivation.  
Nuclear latency also offers a telling indicator to observe gradualist behavior to 
counter-proliferation because it is a new method of proliferation that pushes the 
acquisition paradigm toward an ambiguous gray zone between pursuing or not pursing 
nuclear capabilities. Nuclear latency allows states to achieve the capacity to quickly 
weaponize, without risking the condemnation and cost that come with acquiring a nuclear 
                                                 
228 Joseph F. Pilat, “Report of a Workshop on Nuclear Latency,” Nuclear Proliferation International 
History Project (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, October 2014), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/exploring-nuclear-latency. 
 81 
weapon outside of international guidelines. It also means the incremental steps available 
to deal with such a threat would also change. China would likely seek a new pathway to 
forestall Japan’s nuclear efforts—coupling diplomatic efforts with more coercive steps, 
such as cyber-attacks. Evidence of increased cyber activity against Japanese nuclear 
infrastructure, coupled with more fervent diplomatic engagement would be a telling 
indicator of China’s willingness to attack if necessary. Regardless of the specific manner 
that China, or any state, would counter the proliferation of a rival, the paradigm shift to 
nuclear latency should remind policymakers to be cognizant that dominant states will be 
forced to shift their gradualist strategies to adjust to new methods of proliferation.  
Another policy-related goal of this thesis is to demonstrate how a better 
understanding of the influence of norms can serve U.S. foreign policy decision-making. 
The first preventive attack to counter proliferation was the Allied commando raid on Nazi 
Germany’s Norwegian heavy water plant at the Norsk Hyrdo site in Vemork, Norway.229 
The precedent set by that attack provides telling lessons for the change in the Unified 
Command Plan (UCP) of the U.S. Department of Defense, which will transfer counter-
proliferation responsibility from Strategic Command to Special Operations Command. 
With special operations forces at the forefront of U.S. defense counter proliferation 
operations, future preventive attack could be again carried out by commando forces or 
their surrogates. Understanding the influences of sovereignty, intervention, and non-
proliferation can provide a worthwhile starting point for how to employ such forces, 
especially when considering the ramifications of whether to keep their role covert. 
Furthermore, as the system leader, the United States has a definitive role in shaping the 
normative landscape of the international system and its actions have the consequence of 
reshaping the standards for appropriate behavior. Preventive attacks to counter nuclear 
proliferation should not only be judged by their effect on the balance of power or their 
enforcement of the non-proliferation norm, but also by how those attacks will adjust the 
line between the norms of sovereignty and intervention. 
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